Personnel, the Class 0 Supply Item: A Logistics Management Approach to Supplying Combatant Commanders with Warfighters by Beard, William P.
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
3-22-2012
Personnel, the Class 0 Supply Item: A Logistics
Management Approach to Supplying Combatant
Commanders with Warfighters
William P. Beard
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Human Resources Management Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Beard, William P., "Personnel, the Class 0 Supply Item: A Logistics Management Approach to Supplying Combatant Commanders
with Warfighters" (2012). Theses and Dissertations. 1195.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/1195
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PERSONNEL, THE CLASS 0 SUPPLY ITEM: A LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT 
APPROACH TO SUPPLYING COMBATANT COMMANDERS WITH 
WARFIGHTERS 
 
THESIS 
 
 
William P. Beard, Captain, USAF 
 
AFIT/LSCM/ENS/12-01 
 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 
 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United 
States Government. 
 AFIT/LSCM/ENS/12-01 
 
PERSONNEL, THE CLASS 0 SUPPLY ITEM: A LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT 
APPROACH 
TO SUPPLYING COMBATANT COMMANDERS WITH WARFIGHTERS 
 
THESIS 
 
Presented to the Faculty 
Department of Department of Logistics Management 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
Air University 
Air Education and Training Command 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Master of Science in Logistics Management 
 
 
WILLIAM P. BEARD 
Captain, USAF 
 
March 2012 
 
 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 
 AFIT/LSCM/ENS/12-01 
 
 
 
PERSONNEL, THE CLASS 0 SUPPLY ITEM: A LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT 
APPROACH 
TO SUPPLYING COMBATANT COMMANDERS WITH WARFIGHTERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William P. Beard 
Captain, USAF 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved: 
 
 
 
 
__________//Signed//_______________ 20 March 2012 
Dr. Sharon G. Heilmann, Lt Col, USAF (Chairman) Date 
Assistant Professor of Logistics and Supply Chain Management 
 
 
__________//Signed//_______________ 20 March 2012 
Dr. Alan W. Johnson (Member)  Date 
Associate Professor of Logistics and Supply Chain Management 
 
 
 
iv 
AFIT/LSCM/ENS/12-01 
 
Abstract 
The Air Force’s end strength has drawn down from 530,000 to just over 332,000 
in the past 20 years.  All indications are that resources will continue to become more 
restricted in the future, including manpower.  Meanwhile, studies indicate that the Air 
Force will likely continue to withdraw permanently stationed forces overseas and rely 
increasingly on the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct for rapid mobility and force 
projection.  With the AEF and efficient manpower utilization projected to become 
increasingly important, this study provides the first examination of the AEF as an 
overarching process for improvement opportunities.  It proposes that the concept of AEF 
requirement fulfillment is actually a supply chain designed to supply Combatant 
Commanders with equipment and warfighters.  It focuses on the fulfillment of manpower 
requirements identifying them as a Class 0 Supply Item and uses Supply Chain and 
Logistics Management principles to conduct an initial examination of the process to 
identify overarching relationships and process flow.  Using the information gathered, it 
then maps the conceptual relationships and develops a statistical probability model to aid 
leaders and future researchers in analyzing expected costs and benefits of various targeted 
changes within the current construct.  This study proposes new methods for managing 
AEF manpower capabilities, a new application of SCM principles, and hopes to be a solid 
platform for a multi-phase study aimed at reengineering the AEF, from force reporting to 
sourcing in an effort to maximize manpower utilization and provide senior leadership and 
the planning community more accurate force accountability. 
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To Mom and Dad 
“When you walk, they will guide you; when you sleep, they will watch over you; when 
you awake, they will speak to you” ~Proverbs 6:22. 
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PERSONNEL, THE CLASS 0 SUPPLY ITEM: A LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT 
APPROACH 
TO SUPPLYING COMBATANT COMMANDERS WITH WARFIGHTERS 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
The official vision of the United States Air Force lists Air and Space Superiority, 
Global Attack, Rapid Global Mobility, Precision Engagement, Information Superiority, 
and Agile Combat Support as the Air Force’s six distinctive capabilities (www.af.mil, 
2012).  At least two of those distinctive capabilities, Rapid Global Mobility & Agile 
Combat Support rely upon the ability to rapidly project our resources anywhere in the 
world.  In part, this means the ability to rapidly send people and equipment anywhere the 
Air Force is called upon.  The future of the Air Force will likely demand continued 
improvement on our processes and resource utilization at a rate the Air Force has yet to 
imagine.   
General Shaud (ret.) and Adam Lowther authored a strategic study of where the 
Air Force will likely need to evolve to in order to meet the requirements of 2020.  In the 
study, they state “conventional power projection against peer or near-peer competitors 
will continue to shape Air Force requirements for the foreseeable future” (Shaud & 
Lowther, 2011).  Additionally, their study proposes “with Air Force power-projection 
capabilities often serving as the single best tool available, options must be scalable. This 
presents a challenge that is proving difficult to overcome in present conflicts.”  They 
continue to propose that the U.S. Forces will likely continue to draw down overseas 
(Shaud & Lowther, 2011).  This paints a picture where the Air Expeditionary Force 
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structure will continue to be critical to our ability to meet future requirements.  What is 
more, the Air Force will need to meet those needs with fewer, and fewer resources. 
Senate Bill 2171 of the 101st Congress directed the 1991 Air Force end strength 
be 530,000 (101st Congress, 1990).  The Air Force end strength for 2012 is directed to be 
just over 332,000 people (112th Congress, 2011).  That is a 37% reduction in forces 
within one, short career-span, and there are no indications that the reductions will stop.   
The saying “do more with less” is often heard, and some may feel it is trite.  What 
we really mean is do better, and with less. Instead, we should identify the things that we 
need to do, and do them better.  Do them better, so that there is less waste, which means 
we will be able to do it with fewer resources.  In any process, you do not attempt to 
increase output while simultaneously decreasing input.  Only after you “optimize” your 
process, can you determine what it is capable of and make an intelligent decision about 
it’s output, and what resources would be required for that output.  In his book “The Goal: 
A Process of Ongoing Improvement”, Eliyahu Goldratt proposed his Theory of 
Constraints and a method of evaluating processes to improve their throughput (Goldratt, 
2004).  Goldratt argues that before you can improve a process, you have to be able to 
measure the process, and before you can even begin to measure a process, you have to 
know what the process hopes to achieve.  You have to know what the goal of the process 
is.  The Air Force is no different.  The Air Force has a “Mission” which is to “Fly, Fight, 
Win”, and it has a vision, which, among other things states we will “support the joint 
mission first.  We will provide compelling air, space, and cyber capabilities for use by the 
combatant commanders” (www.af.mil, 2012).  In effect, supporting the needs of the 
Combatant Commanders (CCDR) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is our goal.   
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As we further examine supporting CCDR’s and the JCS by asking “how will we 
do this”, one answer is, with the Air Expeditionary Task Force and through the use of 
scalable resources to meet the CCDR’s need for capabilities.  In other words, providing 
the JCS and CCDR with a list of capabilities, and fulfilling their need when, where, and 
how they need them.  That statement is remarkably similar to a common phrase used in 
many descriptions of lean logistics, which is “the correct item, in the right quantity, to the 
right place, at the right time”.  The most basic capability the Air Force provides CCDR’s, 
is a trained warfighter, which makes our dwindling resource of manpower, also a critical 
resource in accomplishing our goal.  That connection drives the purpose of this study.  
This study will evaluate the process the Air Force uses to supply CCDR’s with 
warfighters.   
The Air Expeditionary Force structure can be argued as the process, and it has 
been studied over the years for sub-process improvement opportunities such as 
intermediate avionic maintenance consolidation (Peltz, 2000) or methods for improved 
capabilities based planning (Snyder & Mills, 2004), but this will be the first time it has 
been evaluated from a Supply Chain Management (SCM) perspective.  This study will 
apply principles of Logistics Management, Supply Chain Management, and Operations 
Management to evaluate the end-to-end process of how the Air Force supplies CCDR’s 
with a warfighter.   
Critical to this evaluation will be the recognition that a warfighter is a resource, 
much like an airplane is a resource. Fundamental to this study is disconnecting the 
portion of that resource that is the human factor such as their individual career plans, 
motivations, and personal intentions, and recognizing that, although important in total 
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force management, those are not what the JCS or the CCDR are requiring.  The JCS and 
CCDR simply require a warfighter capable of a clearly defined set of capabilities.  This 
understanding implies the clinical definition of a warfighter as an asset, which should be 
categorized by it capabilities, and managed appropriately, much the same as you would 
expect any other asset the Air Force manages.  At the most basic level, the Air Force is 
responsible for managing the warfighter and getting the correct warfighter to the right 
place and at the right time… just like any other class of supply.  In essence, this makes 
the warfighter a class of supply.  If we put it first, then it would be the class zero supply 
item. 
In their book “Reengineering the Corporation: A Manefesto for Business 
Revolution”, Hammer & Champy (1993) argue that a fundamental concept behind truly 
improving a process is the need to approach the process as a whole, from the top down 
with the buy-in of the entire process owner.  They argue that any optimization of 
individual processes ignorant of the larger process to which they belong, is called sub-
optimization and actually reduces the efficiency of the overall process.  They point out 
that sub-optimization is how a bureaucracy perpetuates, and only through a top down full 
process reengineering effort, can you identify and eliminate the sub-optimizations.  This 
means that the only way to make the process of supplying CCDR’s with warfighters as 
efficient as possible is to attack it as a whole.   
Before a reengineering attempt is made however, first we need to identify if the 
process should be reengineered.  To determine that, we need to look at the metrics 
measuring how well we manage our Class 0 supplies.  If a warfighter is a supply item, the 
CCDR is the customer ordering a specific type of warfighter, then their home units are 
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the storage locations and accurately selecting the correct type of warfighter is the process.  
Physical movement of the warfighter to the CCDR is beyond the scope of this study. 
  If we attempt to measure the efficiency of the process by only measuring what 
percentage of CCDR requirements are met, in supply terminology that would be referred 
to as the order fill rate.  This rating can be misleading because although it indicates if we 
met our goal, it does not indicate how efficiently we met our goal.  There is no indication 
of how many resources it took, how effective we were at categorizing our resources, 
knowing exactly what resources we had available, how accurately we can predict our true 
capabilities, or how well we did at attempting to source (issue) those resources.  
There are other metrics used to provide valuable insight into the health of the 
supply system.  Among those are inventory accuracy, and warehouse refusal rates.  
Inventory accuracy refers to how accurately what you think you have compares to what 
you really have.  Warehouse refusal refers to how often we attempt to use an asset we 
think we have, but for some reason cannot.  Common causes of warehouse refusals are 
inaccurate inventories and miscategorized assets.  Department of Defense Instructions 
state the minimum standard for Inventory Accuracy is 98% (DODI_5000.64, 2011). We 
can easily apply these terms to our Class 0 supply system to get a basic idea of how well 
we are managing those resources as well… as they pertain to knowing what we have 
(capabilities) and ability to effectively find them and get them to the customer.  An AEF 
adapted metric similar to inventory accuracy or warehouse refusal as they pertain to the 
AEF construct could be measured by how many taskings we successfully source on the 
first attempt.  This is important because it is the fundamental building block of knowing 
what you have (capability).  If you know your inventory accuracy averages 98.6%, and 
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you have 40,000 warfighters in the vulnerability window, then you should be able to 
confidently build commitments for 39,440 of them.  Inventory accuracy is just a lagging 
indicator though.  For inventory accuracy to be high, other processes must be in good 
order.  One of which is making sure you properly inventory and categorize your assets 
when you put them on the shelf.  If we apply warehouse refusals to the process of 
supplying CCDR’s with warfighters, a metric that may represent warehouse refusals is 
the reclama rate.  When we attempt to “go to the shelf” to grab a warfighter for a CCDR 
and for some reason that warfighter is not there, is not capable, or otherwise can not fill 
the requirement, a reclama is generated.  According to data in an AFMC AEF debrief 
presented to Lt Gen Moore on 4 November 2011 that references data from April-
September of 2011, the Air Force attempted to source 23,013 CCDR requirements.  Of 
those requirements, there were 2,376 reclamas.  That is an 11% warehouse refusal rate, 
which means only an 89% inventory accuracy rate.  Applied to the entire Air Force 
inventory of over 332,000 warfighters, an 89% inventory accuracy means we do not 
know the true status/capability for 34,528 warfighters, leaving us only 297,742 we can 
account for.  It is important to note that all of the warfighters we already know cannot 
deploy are part of the 297, 742.  The 34,528 are all warfighters we currently think are 
assets ready for a CCDR. 
Given that metric, this study will attempt to identify areas to focus improvement 
efforts in and attempt to provide a roadmap for better asset accountability and ultimately 
better resource management using current literature, guidance, and interviews with sub-
process experts in an attempt to discover the current process of how a CCDR’s 
requirement becomes an Air Force tasking, how the Air Force postures itself to meet 
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those requirements, how we categorize our warfighters, and how we determine which 
warfighter to assign to which tasking.  Next, this study will create a conceptual Supply 
Chain Map to help create a visual representation of the process.  This visual 
representation will help identify possible redundancies, oversights, or other opportunities 
for improvement that may exist in the process.  Using the Supply Chain Map, and 
information developed during the process discovery, a statistical probabilities decision 
tree was developed to help future researchers and leadership visualize how improvements 
in various areas of the process will affect the goal and metrics supporting the goal.  
Finally, process improvement recommendations will be presented, as well as 
identification of area’s that may benefit from additional research.    
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II.  Methodology  
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the methods used in this study.  The 
overall concept of the study is the initial data gathering and conceptual mapping of the 
very large, complex process the Air Force uses to supply CCDR’s with warfighters.  It 
uses the principles presented by Hammer and Champy in their book “Reengineering the 
Corporation: A Manefesto for Business Revolution” (1993) to build towards an improved 
process for providing CCDR’s with warfighters.  This applies the data and conceptual 
mapping in a method conducive with many process improvement initiatives such as the 
Observe and Orient phases of the Air Force Smart Operations for the 21
st
 Century 
(AFSO-21) program or the Define and Measure phases of the DMAIC methodology used 
in Six-Sigma process redesign. 
 The first part of defining the process will be a “Process Discovery”, which will 
use a combination of literature and interviews to identify the current process.  A review 
was conducted of all currently published guidance pertaining to how the Air Force gets 
tasked with CCDR requirements, how the Air Force organizes it’s capabilities, how the 
Air Force selects capabilities for tasking, as well as guidance relating to duty status 
coding, COCOM restrictions, COCOM required processes, and medical patient 
administration.  It attempted to clarify the literature and confirm actual process practices 
by interviewing sub-process experts.   
 Additional clarification was sought from sub-process subject matter experts at 
different levels.   To gain first-hand experience with various Electronic Data Interface 
(EDI) systems and their products, telephone and in-person interviews were conducted 
with AFMC Subject Matter Experts (SME)’s. The interviews had an open format with no 
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scripted questions.  One individual is a Personnel Specialist at AFMC/A1R, the other is 
the AFMC ART Manager. Additional telephone interviews as well as written 
correspondence were conducted with various other process owners, and subject matter 
experts (SME)’s to validate conceptions of the overall process and different sub-
processes developed from the literature review.   
Other agencies contributing to the pool of experts were AFPC/DPW, AFPC’s 
Medical Retention Standards Branch, AFCENT/SG, CENTCOM/SG, and AFMC/A4.  
Communication with AFPC/DPW occurred via telephone interviews and written 
correspondence.  AFPC/DPW controlled access to the schedulers, therefore participant 
selection was less than ideal and a true Delphi study of AFPC/DPW’s sub-process was 
unobtainable, however the deputy director of scheduling, a lead scheduler, and at least 2 
other schedulers provided input and participated in concept verifications suggesting the 
sub-process is accurately represented. 
 Validating processes was accomplished by communicating a perception of the 
process and soliciting clarification or corrections.  When corrections were suggested, the 
original perceived procedure was corrected and returned to the interviewee as well as 
other individuals in the pool of experts to verify accuracy.  
Once a thorough understanding of the process is achieved and detailed in the 
Process Discovery, the next objective of this study is to use that information to create 
basic, conceptual supply chain maps of the process.  The conceptual supply chain maps 
will show the warfighter as the product, and the CCDR as the customer.  Illustrating 
supply chain maps provide many benefits.  Among them are providing a “visual 
representation and analysis of the complexities in… direct and indirect supply chain 
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relationships [serving] as a starting point for increasing the cross-functional and cross-
[organizational] communication… also enables management to identify internal and 
external improvement opportunities and establish the critical relationship linkages that 
must be closely managed”.  Supply chain maps can be “used to identify and realize 
improvement opportunities across the network of companies that constitute the supply 
chain” (Lambert, Garcia-Dastugue, & Knemeyer, 2008).  Instead of mapping different 
companies however, this study will view individual units as the companies comprising 
the supply chain network.  There are several different types of supply chain maps that 
may be beneficial, however they require significant participation and data.  Therefore, 
this thesis aims to use a simplified “Extended Value Stream Map” to illustrate basic 
relationships and interactions in an attempt to present a big-picture perspective of the 
Class-0 supply process.   
Data access was severely restricted.  AFPC is the lowest level capable of 
accessing much of the data requested however formal requests for data were denied. 
Several other agencies either denied requests for data or did not track the data requested.  
As a result, the only data available was raw medical waiver tracking data from 
AFCENT/SG and AF AEF metrics compiled and reported to senior leaders, provided by 
AFMC/A4.  The AFCENT medical waiver data was a spreadsheet tracking all waivers 
received from July 2010 through November 2011 (n=820).  AFCENT speculated the fact 
that their status as the largest customer of warfighters contributed to their status as the 
only Component Command with formal waiver data.  This status was confirmed by 
AFPC and supports the assumption that AFCENT medical waiver data is a sufficient 
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representation of Air Force medical waiver statistics to enable coarse estimations for the 
purposes of overall deployment process evaluation.  
Data obtained from AFMC was in the form of a power point briefing presented to 
the Vice Commander of AFMC on November 11, 2011.  This briefing presents metrics 
based on data collected from 1 April 2011 through 30 September 2011.  The briefing 
provides various metrics and data for several MAJCOMS and DRU’s as well as 
combined Air Force data. 
Finally, given a conceptual map of the Class-0 supply chain, a description of the 
process, and the data collected, this thesis will develop a statistical probability decision 
tree that will illustrate probability of sourcing results given various inputs.  The inputs in 
the statistical probability tree will be based on actual or assumed data controlling the 
probabilities.  This statistical probability decision tree will provide leadership with a tool 
to manipulate various metrics related to the process and visualize the results they have on 
the final outcomes such as number of medical reclama’s, or number of total taskings.  It 
will also identify what metrics are important to control the desired outcomes as well as 
distinguish the metrics currently overlooked.  Identifying critical metrics and an ability to 
visualize how focused improvements or changes impact the process will enable better 
decision making and help identify areas for future improvement efforts. 
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III. Process Discovery 
The purpose of this chapter is process discovery.  It will use a review existing 
literature and regulatory guidance, and personal interviews to identify the process of how 
the Air Force provides manpower to support Department of Defense (DoD) requirements.  
It will explore how Presidential, Secretary of Defense, and Joint requirements are 
assigned to individual services to support.  It will identify how the Air Force organizes 
itself to support those requirements.  This chapter will identify the Automated Data 
Processing (ADP), also referred to as Electronic Data Interface (EDI) systems utilized to 
maintain current operations and follow the process of turning a manpower requirement 
into an actual individual prepared to deploy.  This chapter will consolidate over 1200 
pages of literature and personal interviews to develop a complete conceptual model of 
how a Combatant Commander’s requirement results in a warfighter ready to deploy.   
 
Establishing Manpower Requirements  
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has many responsibilities.  Among 
those responsibilities are advising the National Security Council, testifying before 
Congress on military affairs, and Assisting the Secretary of Defense in planning and 
employment of military forces to include providing military forces to combatant 
commanders  (CJCSI3100.01B, 2008).  
 The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is process that provides a means for 
the CJCS and other members of the Joint Planning community to communicate, plan, and 
13 
advise on military strategy and capabilities to develop our National Military Strategy and 
Figure 2: JSPS Execution (CJCSI 3100.01B, 2008) 
 
Figure 1: Joint Sourcing Planning System (CJCSI 3100.01B, 2008) 
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the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).  Figure 1 depicts the roles of the CJCS and 
the JSPS, Figure 2 depicts the execution of the JSPS.  
 The two JSPS outputs of focus are the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the 
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).  The NMS is the military strategy for how the 
military will support the National Security and Defense Strategies and other objectives.  
The JSCP… 
provides guidance to combatant commanders, Service Chiefs, Combat 
Support Agency (CSA) directors, applicable Defense agencies, DOD Field 
Activity directors, and the Chief, National Guard Bureau (NGB) to 
accomplish tasks and missions based on near-term military capabilities. 
The JSCP implements campaign, campaign support, contingency, and 
posture planning guidance reflected in the Guidance for Employment of 
the Force” (CJCSI3100.01B, 2008). 
The JSCP formally tasks campaign, contingency, and posture planning.  It also contains 
detailed guidance, tasks, appropriation of forces and planning assumptions.  
The DoD uses the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) as the 
overarching umbrella system for ADP.  JOPES provides an electronic platform to allow 
the military community to interface, plan, store, and communicate requirements.  It is 
supported by a network of ADP systems from across the DoD that resides on the Global 
Command and Control System (GCCS).  JOPES contains the mechanisms necessary to 
plan, and implement military action and manage Global Force Management (GFM) 
guidance.  The GFM Board is comprised of members of the Joint Staff, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, the combatant commands, and the military services.  The board is 
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what provides prioritized guidance for force management to support operational and 
rotational force support to combatant commander requirements (AFI_10-401, 2010).  
There are several different types of planning, however the scope of this project is 
only to evaluate the system for supporting rotational forces.   Supporting rotational forces 
means that an actual Contingency or Adaptive Plan was implemented and has progressed 
to a sustainment mode.   
In accordance with the GFMIG, JFCOM, TRANSCOM, and SOCOM are 
the designated JFPs for conventional forces, mobility forces, and special 
operations forces, respectively...The Joint Staff tasks JFPs to recommend 
global force sourcing solutions for global CCDR [Combatant Commander] 
requirements; these sourcing solutions may be from assigned forces, 
forces assigned to other CCDRs, or Service-retained forces (AFI_10-401, 
2010).   
This is how the Air Force was apportioned all taskings it currently supports.  In addition 
to current taskings, sometimes CCDR’s require additional forces.  These forces may be 
either an additional capability or an increase in a current capability provided by a 
standard force package. If a CCDR wishes to increase a current standard force capability 
by no more than 10 persons or 10%, he may submit an Authorization Change Request 
(ACR).  An ACR can bypass the Joint Staff a go directly to the Service providing the 
forces (force provider) (AFI_10-401, 2010).  If the force is not a standard force 
capability, is not supporting an existing Global Force Management (GFM) approved 
authorization, or exceeds the 10-person / 10% rule, the CCDR must submit a Request for 
Forces/Capabilities (RFF/C).  The RFF/C must go through the entire JFP sourcing  
16 
 
procedure for approval, JFP sourcing strategies, service concurrence, and finally 
recommendation for SecDef approval.  This is how the Air Force receives it is 
apportionment of tasking’s to support Joint Staff and CCDR Requirements for rotational 
operations (see Fig 3). 
While JOPES is the DoD planning and execution system, the Deliberate and 
Crisis Action Planning and Execution Segments (DCAPES) is the Air Forces’ war 
planning system and provides the Air Force feed to JOPES (AFI_10-401, 2010).   
“Air Force planners and readiness offices use DCAPES at various 
command levels to translate contingency planning, JCS exercise, real 
world crisis execution, or local exercise taskings into detailed unit 
requirements down to the AFSC and tool box level. Air Force planners, 
Figure 3. Request for Forces/Capabilities (AFI 10-401, 2008) 
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readiness personnel, FAMs [functional area managers], and unit 
deployment managers (UDMs) use the data in DCAPES to prepare 
resources for movement and accomplish force accountability at the 
deployment and employment locations” (AFI_10-401, 2010).  
“DCAPES is at the heart of the Air Force’s War Planning and Execution 
System (WPES); a comprehensive, net-centric system of systems used in 
war planning and execution for the purpose of presenting, planning, 
sourcing, mobilizing, deploying, accounting for, sustaining, redeploying, 
and reconstituting AF forces; and provides a Service feed to JOPES. 
NOTE: WPES includes LOGMOD, BaS&E (formerly LOGCAT), 
LOGFAC, DCAPES, UTC Availability (formerly AFWUS), and several 
other war planning and execution systems” (AFI_10-403, 2008) 
One very important JOPES product accessed through DCAPES is the Time 
Phased Force Deployment Document (TPFDD). The TPFDD is a listing of all forces 
required to support a plan and it is the document that ultimately choreographs the 
implementation of military action.  Among other things, it contains the Unit Type Code 
(UTC) of the forces required, dictates a movement plan, key movement dates,  
deployed location, and CCDR remarks.   
 
The Air Expeditionary Force  
The Air Force aligns its war fighting capabilities into a baseline of 10 
AEFs, each intended to contain an equivalent capability from which to 
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provide forces. During periods of increased requirements, capability areas 
from these 10 AEFs may be realigned within the Global AEF construct to 
a Tempo Band that provides a deeper pool of capability, deploying that 
capability at a more stringent deploy-to-dwell rate. The Air Force 
develops and tailors force packages to meet mission requirements. 
Specifically tailored forces are presented to theater commanders as Air 
and Space Expeditionary Task Forces (AETFs)” (AFI_10-244, 2010).  
 In addition to a brief description of the AEF, this indicates that the ideal state of the AEF 
is utilizing the baseline of 10 AEF’s and any other alignment should be considered a 
“period of increased requirement”.   
 All Air Force units have fundamental capabilities they are suppose to be able to 
provide the CJCS. This capability is defined in their DOC.  Unit Commanders are 
required to assess their ability to provide these capabilities within their required response 
time. CJCSM 3150.02 states that Unit Commanders are to report their units capabilities 
based on organic resources under their control and “personnel or equipment from units 
providing resources or gained through deployments qualify as organic resources. US Air 
Force mobile or transportable communications organizations may include those resources 
on loan that can be re-deployed within organizational-tasked response time, not to exceed 
72 hours.”  The status of the unit’s capabilities are reported to the CJCS through the use 
of the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS).   
 While SORTS is how Unit Commanders report on their units overall capabilities, 
breaking forces down into smaller capability-related pieces called Unit Type Code’s 
(UTC’s) provides more flexibility. UTC’s are very narrowly scoped packages of 
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equipment and or manpower representing a potential capability the Air Force possesses.  
A UTC can be equipment only, such as a special vehicle, it can be a combination of 
equipment and personnel, such as a Security Forces team and the equipment they need 
for integrated base defense, or it can be only personnel, such as a 2-person Tactical Air 
Control Party, or a single individual such as a Logistics Readiness Officer.  Every UTC 
has a Mission Capabilities Statement (MISCAP) that defines the basic mission the UTC 
is capable of accomplishing (AFI_10-401, 2010).  UTC’s can be thought of as individual 
building blocks of military capability.  These building blocks can be combined in 
countless combinations to build the desired force such as an AETF, or they can be singled 
out to fill a specific gap anywhere in the military such as a one-person Logistics 
Readiness Officer UTC being used to fill an Army unit’s vacancy that is similar to the 
MISCAP of the Air Force UTC. The remainder of this study will only focus on UTC’s 
that include personnel.  There are two types of UTC’s, standard and non-standard.  
Standard UTC’s are the UTC’s that, among other things, have standardized MISCAPs 
and fully developed movement data.  If you come to associate a particular set of 
manpower and equipment to represent a particular UTC, that would most likely be a 
“Standard UTC”.  Associate UTC’s are a type of non-standard UTC.  AFI 10-401 directs 
“Unit manpower that cannot be captured in a standard UTC will be postured into an 
"Associate" UTC.  Associate UTCs are placeholders for all funded military 
authorizations that cannot be described or do not fit into an existing standard UTC. Each 
functional area has an Associate UTC to represent that functional area. The Associate 
UTCs themselves are not deployable, but the individuals filling the authorizations that are 
associated with the UTC are deployable.”  Basically this directs all personnel to be 
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postured in a UTC for deployment and explains the practice of creating Associate UTC’s 
to account for personnel even though all standard UTC’s are fully manned.  This also 
supports AFI 10-401 paragraph 7.7.2 where it directs “all forces are inherently 
deployable.”   
All UTC’s are cataloged in the AEF Capability Library.  “The AEF Capability 
Library contains the Air Force‘s total warfighting capability in terms of UTCs. The 
library consists of all the forces postured in the five primary and two ARC Tempo Bands 
plus the Enabler force. AEF Capability data is currently in the AEF TPFDD Libraries, 
located in DCAPES. When this data migrates to the UTC Availability (UTA) application 
of DCAPES, the TPFDD libraries will be phased out (AFI_10-401, 2010).   Overall 
responsibility for managing the AEF Library rests with AFPC/DPW.  Individual UTC’s 
are managed by their Functional Area Managers (FAM’s) at HAF (AFI_10-401, 2010). 
There are four basic components of the AEF, readily available forces, enabler 
forces, in-place forces, and institutional forces.  Institutional forces are the forces 
necessary to sustain fundamental Air Force processes while the other three comprise the 
Air Force’s primary war fighting capability.   The readily available forces are aligned in 
one of 10 AEF’s, which are paired together to create 5 deployment cycles over a 24-
month period.  “During periods of increased requirements” the AEF’s are realigned into 
tempo bands that deploy resources at a progressively increasing rate (AFI_10-401, 2010).  
Enabler forces are those forces that have special missions that prevent standard rotational 
tasking and/or are high demand/low supply.  Institutional and in place support forces are 
forces that are either primarily in direct support of the CCDR or are required for essential 
home station operations.  These forces are now referred to as institutional forces.  They 
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are still deployable capabilities, however they are aligned in a separate tempo band and 
normally only deploy to fill Individual Augmentee positions on an approved JMD .    
The standard AEF construct is based on 2 fiscal years, giving it a 24-month cycle.    
It contains “buckets” in which UTC’s will be postured.  The number of buckets depends 
on which tempo band that UTC is in as well.  There are three basic places in the AEF’s 
tempo-band battle rhythm that forces postured in AEFs will be in at any given time.  The 
Vulnerability period, during which the personnel assigned to the UTC’s postured for that 
AEF are the forces expected to support any validated CCDR requirements that arise or 
are scheduled during that period.  Forces not deployed during their vulnerability period 
remain on-call for their entire vulnerability period.  Reconstitution & Training is the 
period after the UTC’s return home and/or the vulnerability period is over.  This is when 
forces resume home-station operations, catch up on training and other military affairs that 
may have lapsed during deployment.   “Prepare to Deploy” or “Spin-up” is the two 
months prior to the start of the vulnerability period.  This time is dedicated to making the 
forces ready to deploy such as getting ahead on training that will lapse during deployment 
and deployment specific training (AFI_10-401, 2010).  Even though there is an official 
“prepare to deploy” phase, some deployment preparations are required prior to this to 
help meet overall AEF planning timelines.  Additionally, some taskings require special 
training that may require individuals to depart or go TDY before they officially enter 
their “prepare to deploy” phase. 
The AEF construct had 5 Active Duty and ARC tempo bands, however it just 
developed an additional tempo band for institutional forces. UTC’s are assigned to AEF 
tempo bands individually based on the number of resources available across the Air 
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Force to meet current and projected requirements, meaning UTC 9xxxx may be in tempo 
band E while a co-worker may be in Tempo band B.  The tempo bands are different 
timelines of vulnerability/deployment duration to reconstitution ratio’s.  For Active Duty, 
Tempo Band-A contains 5 buckets that have 4-months vulnerability and 14-months 
reconstitution.  Band-B contains 5 buckets that have 6-months vulnerability and 22-
months reconstitution see Figure 4.  Tempo Band-A and B represent a similar operations 
Figure 4; AEF Band A & B (AFI 10-401, 
2010) 
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tempo, they only differ in their standard deployment length.  Originally, the AEF was 
based on a 4-month deployment standard, however the AEF standard recently changed to 
6-month deployments.  This now makes Tempo Band-B the point of homeostasis. 
Figure 5: AEF Bands C, D, & E (AFI 10-401, 2010) 
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As the requirements for a UTC increases and makes Band-A or B infeasible, the 
vulnerability to reconstitution & prepare time, also known as “dwell ratio” or 
“deployment ratio” increases.  Tempo Band-C aligns the UTC’s into 4 buckets with 6-
months vulnerability and 18-months reconstitution & prepare to deploy, for a dwell ratio 
of 1:3.  Tempo Band-D aligns the UTC’s into 3 buckets with 6-months vulnerability and 
12-months reconstitution & prepare to deploy for a dwell ratio of 1:2.  Tempo Band E is 
the most rigorous and has 6-months vulnerability with 6-months reconstitution & prepare 
to deploy, see Figure 5. 
The newest addition to the AEF construct is Tempo Band-X.  Air Force 
leadership realized that some forces are necessary to maintaining home station operations 
and other institutional capabilities that can not be allowed to fail.  In the past, these forces 
were assigned to UTC’s and managed no different than the rest of the Air Force.  This 
caused the Air Force to appear to have greater deployable capabilities than it truly 
possessed.  To fix this, Band X was created.  Now, these institutional forces are aligned 
to Band X instead of comingling with the rest of the Air Force capabilities postured in 
Band A through E.  In addition to realigning capabilities, the Air Force realigned how 
they source CCDR requirements.  Now, CCDR requirements that are institutional in 
nature and on a Joint Manning Document (JMD) are primarily sourced from Band-X 
capabilities.  Band-X operates on a similar operations tempo to Band-B, which is 6-
months vulnerability and 22-months reconstitution for a dwell ratio of 1:5.  Band-X can 
be sourced to fill non-institutional requirements as necessary to prevent the Air Force 
from telling the JCS we are unable to meet a requirement (service level reclama). 
An active component (AC) employment ratio of one deployment period 
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followed by a dwell period of twice the deployment period (1:2) for all 
postured capabilities is considered the maximum sustainable utilization 
rate while maintaining total Air Force unit readiness at C1/C2. This ratio 
coincides with the SecDef deploy-to-dwell planning objective…Specific 
functional areas will enter surge operations or surpass trigger points at 
different times. If the new requirements are enduring, the functional area 
should re-band capability during the next AEF Schedule 
evaluation…Identifying when a functional area is required to enter surge 
is a HAF FAM responsibility (AFI_10-401, 2010).   
The C1/C2 readiness capability cited above refers to the SORTS readiness code.  
 
Electronic Data Interface Systems Used to Support the AEF Process  
The Joint Planning and Execution System (JOPES) supports all aspects of 
military planning, and command and control.   It is the umbrella platform that all of the 
other systems will ultimately feed.  Most relevant to this study, it provides the joint 
interface allowing CCDR requirements to be properly vetted, approved, and recognized 
in the TPFDD.  It contains the TPFDD and provides it to subordinate systems.  The Air 
Force system for deployment planning is called Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning 
and Execution Segments (DCAPES).  
 DCAPES interfaces with JOPES, and provides the heart of the Air Force War 
Planning and Execution System (WPES), which is comprised of several specialized sub-
systems that interface to provide full unit-level visibility and interface, see Figure 6.  The 
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systems comprising WPES are both classified and unclassified.  They cover everything 
from the Integrated Deployment System (IDS), which contains systems such as 
LOGMOD, CMOS, AALPS, the War Management Plan (WMP) and the AEF online. 
  MANPER-B is a classified manpower tracking system that allows for 
accountability of all manpower forces. Another personnel related system is the Military 
Personnel Data System (MilPDS).   
MilPDS is an unclassified database that tracks every aspect of everyone’s military 
service.  It is used in the assignment process, tracks everyone’s UTC and AEF alignment, 
provides deployment history and overseas return dates as well as indicating Duty Status 
Codes, Assignment Availability Codes (AAC), Deployment Availability Codes (DAV), 
Figure 6: War Planning & Execution System (AFI 10-401, 2010) 
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and Assignment Limitation Codes (ALC’s).  It can be used to assign an individual to a 
tasking requirement and feeds DCAPES which then updates the JOPES TPFDD.   
The AEF Reporting Tool (ART) is a…  
CSAF-directed system at the [AFPC/DPW] that was developed to measure 
AEF readiness. It is a secure, web-based tool that resides on the 
SIPRNET. It addresses readiness at the UTC level… ART enables 
commanders to report the ability of a standard UTC to perform its Mission 
Capability Statement (MISCAP) anywhere in the world at the time of the 
assessment and identify capability through the next AEF pair. It highlights 
missing resources and helps to quantify missing requirements for 
additional justification when submitting budgets. It also provides the 
ability to evaluate a UTC prior to tasking…and helps to forecast shortfalls. 
Unlike SORTS, ART is the only assessment system that goes down to the 
UTC level. Note: ART does not measure a UTCs availability to deploy, 
only its ability to meet its MISCAP should it be tasked (AFI_10-401, 
2010).  
One of the things ART provides is an Air Force specific tool for Unit Commanders to 
associate forces with UTC’s, and report their status up the chain of command all the way 
to the CSAF level as well as provide a readily available output at all levels to assist in 
sourcing decisions and force management.  Commanders assess UTC’s with a color code 
to indicate their overall availability status.  There is also a place to provide ALC’s, 
AAC’s, DAV’s, an ability to record a general categorization of the reason for any 
restrictions as well as a section for plain English Commanders remarks/comments. 
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Another system under the AEF Online umbrella is the Enhanced Contingency Rotational 
AEF Scheduling Tool (ECAST). 
ECAST is a system that provides AFPC/DPW the ability to manage and source 
requirements.  It gives functional schedulers at AFPC/DPW the ability to access UTC 
data, interface with the WPES providing access to MilPDS, ART and the AEF Library 
(AFI_10-401, 2010).  It is the primary means of AFPC/DPW interface with the WPES for 
scheduling and sourcing CCDR requirements.   
 
Capability Limitations  
Duty limiting conditions are conditions that may limit the individuals activities at 
home station, may limit assignment availability, and/or limit their ability to deploy.  
There are numerous reasons an individual may have a duty limiting condition such as 
being a student, being court martialed, or a medical restriction.  DAV codes are two digit 
codes that represent an individual’s ability to deploy.  The codes are listed in AFI 10-403, 
Attachment 2, table A2.2.  For example, DAV-64 indicates mobility training is required; 
DAV- 49 indicates the individual can not deploy due to pregnancy.  Out of the nearly 60 
possible DAV codes, only a few are used to help communicate medical restrictions.   
DAV-40 limits assignment to a base with a hospital.  DAV-41 is a generic medical 
deferment.  DAV-42 is awaiting a physical evaluation board, and DAV-48 is a generic 
medical disqualification. Those are the full definitions of those DAV codes, therefore it is 
critical to provide more information in ART when assessing a UTC, see Apendix A for a 
full listing of DAV codes and their definitions.   
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Assignment limitations may be permanent or semi-permanent; ALC’s are used to 
communicate these assignment limitations in ART.  Similar to DAV codes, they indicate 
a condition that limits or restricts if and/or where an individual may be assigned or 
deployed.  “Normally, limitations applying only to a current assignment or location are 
managed by an AAC” (AFI_36-2110, 2011).   
If an individual is subject to a medical condition that is expected to resolve in less 
than 30 days, the only documentation of their condition is their AF Form 469, commonly 
known as a medical profile.  Medical conditions expected to resolve within 30 days are 
not considered a limitation when assessing UTC’s.   
When an individual is medically restricted from worldwide mobility for what is 
expected to be more than 30 days, but less than 12 months, an AAC-31 is input in 
MilPDS and ART.  “When an Airman is scheduled for a mandatory PCS while 
temporarily medically deferred from PCS, MTF officials determine if the Airman will 
proceed on PCS and can be evaluated and/or treated upon arrival at the next duty station” 
(AFI_36-2110, 2011).  This is an important statement because it gives the Medical 
Treatment Facility the ability to assess an individual’s medical condition and their ability 
to go to their gaining base, however this is only for PCS.  For deployments there is a 
much more lengthy process that will be described later.    
If an individual’s medical condition is expected to restrict their worldwide 
mobility status for more than 12 months, they must be reviewed by a Medical Evaluation 
Board (MEB) or Physical Evaluation Board (PEB).  When an individual is deferred 
awaiting an MEB, their status should indicate an AAC-37.  When an individual is 
undergoing an MEB, they are restricted from PCS, TDY, and even leave outside the local 
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area until results are determined.   
“When a PEB directs an Airman to remain on active duty, who may not be fully 
qualified for World Wide service…HQ AFPC/DPAMM will [assign]… ALC X, Y, or 
C”.  “Assignments or deployments outside the designated geographic restrictions require 
a waiver” (AFI_36-2110, 2011).  For individuals with medical limitations that meet the 
MEB/PEB and are returned to service their ALC will be one of three codes, ALC-C1, C2, 
or C3.  These ALC’s are tracked in MilPDS and Commanders also use these codes to 
asses the UTC the individuals are assigned to in ART.  The Commander needs to 
properly code the UTC, and attempt to articulate the limitation in the comments.  In an 
effort to avoid entanglement with The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy and Security Rules, current practice restricts the comments 
in ART from divulging any information that gives indication of an actual diagnosis. 
Definitions of ALC-C1, 2, and 3 can be found in several different AFI’s.  The 
different AFI’s are mostly standardized in their descriptions, however in some places, 
slightly different wording of what these three “C-codes” mean can be found.  In fact, 
AFMC Memorandum for ART Reporting dated 6 October 2011 states "the current 
reporting mechanism in ART does not match profile categories used by the medical 
community” (Huber, 2011).  AFI 48-123 “Medical Examinations and Standards”, AFI 
10-203 “Duty Limiting Conditions” and AFI 41-210 “Patient Administrative Functions” 
all cite definitions, and their definitions all indicate the same generic restrictions.  AFI 
41-210 “Patient Administrative Functions” states,  
ALC-C1 Deployable/Assignable to Global DoD fixed installations 
with intrinsic Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF). This code will be used 
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primarily to identify individuals with temporary or mild conditions 
requiring medical follow-up but whose condition is clinically quiescent or 
unlikely to cause serious impact if untreated or treatment is limited to 
primary care during periods of deployment or assignment.   
ALC-C2 Deployable/Assignable to CONUS installations with 
intrinsic fixed MTFs (Tricare Network availability assumed). This ALC-C 
will be used for medical conditions for which specialist medical care and 
referral within one year is likely but who could be deployed or reassigned 
OCONUS or to non-fixed environments if appropriate specialty care is 
available, or for short periods of time.  
ALC-C3 Non-Deployable/Assignment limited to specific CONUS 
installations based on medical need. This ALC-C stratification designates 
members who should not be deployed or assigned away from specialty 
medical capability required to manage their unique medical condition 
(AFI_41-210, 2010). 
The general takeaway from these definitions are that all ALC’s represent persistent 
medical conditions that a Medical Evaluation Board determined did not prevent the 
member from still being a valued contributor to the Air Force, see Figure 7 for a 
flowchart of the MEB/PEB process.  ALC-C1 should represent a condition that is mild 
and should not restrict deployments.  ALC-C2 is more restrictive, but still conditions that 
may be capable of deployment to CONUS locations and a select few overseas locations.  
ALC-C3 is the most restrictive and should be considered non-deployable.  These should 
be the conditions that require continuous management by their medical specialist.   
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Figure 7: MEB Process (AFI_41-210, 2010) 
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In the interest of the members health and safety, ALC conditions require a 
medical clearance before the Air Force sends them anywhere, whether it is for 
deployment or permanent assignment.  For a deployment, the member’s MTF first 
evaluates the member’s ability to receive necessary treatment at the deployed location, to 
include any forward deployment possibility as well.  If the MTF determines the member 
can deploy, they forward a request for a waiver to the Air Force Component 
Headquarters, for example AFCENT if the deployment is to CENTCOM.  The 
Component Headquarters Surgeon General will then evaluate the members ability to 
safely deploy to meet tasking requirements and either approve or disapprove the waiver.  
If the waiver is approved at the Component Headquarters, the waiver is then sent to the 
Combatant Command’s Surgeon General for approval.  In this example it would be 
CENTCOM/SG.  The Combatant Command’s Surgeon General then reviews the 
information and either grants final approval or disapproval of the waiver 
(USAFCENT/SG, 2012).  Currently, CENTCOM has delegated waiver authority for all 
medical conditions except behavioral to the Component Command (USCENTCOM, 
2011).  In an interview with the CENTCOM medical clearances branch, it was revealed 
that only some medical clearances are actually approved/disapproved based on the actual, 
specific medical capabilities of the location the individual will deploy to, most clearances 
are approved/disapproved based on the general CENTCOM medical policies published in 
their Individual Protection and Individual-Unit Deployment Policy, currently referred to 
as “Mod-11” (CENTCOM/SG, 2011). 
 MOD-11 is a policy letter published by CENTCOM, which outlines medically 
related information and requirements to deploy into the CENTCOM AOR.  This 
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document is updated annually and distributed so that anyone desiring access can obtain it.  
Among other things, this document lists the minimum medical capabilities required by 
CENTCOM.  It lists several conditions that individuals should not deploy with unless a 
waiver is granted.  The listing is very broad in scope, however not in depth meaning it 
encompasses a very wide range of ailments, more than likely enough to capture any 
condition worthy of an ALC-C code.  However it does not go into enough detail to 
determine any type of guess as to whether a waiver would be approved.  It does however 
list a few very specific conditions that will not be waived; this is helpful in knowing in 
advance which conditions would definitely be disapproved.   
 The USAFCENT/SG Medical Waiver Guide directs “submit packages up to three 
months prior to deployment or pre-deployment training, (longer if situation warrants).  
Waivers must be submitted at least one week prior to first movement date”.  This timeline 
conflicts with the AEF planning timeline which attempts to have taskings sourced 
approximately 114 to 142 days prior to deployment, depending on the duration of the 
deployment.  The waiver guidance would potentially cause units to wait for up to 52 days 
after receiving tasking notification before initiating a medical waiver to determine 
eligibility. 
 
Reporting Status of Forces  
 Unit Commanders are required to assign their personnel to an AEF bucket and 
associate them with a UTC.  Assigning individuals to an AEF bucket is intended to 
provide some stability and predictability for the member.  It allows members to know 
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when they are typically vulnerable.   
 ART is a tool that provides UTC status visibility to the entire chain of command 
and it provides several levels of detail that are intended to give the decision makers 
enough information to make well informed decisions at all levels.  ART is intended to 
enable the decision makers to know if UTC’s are able to accomplish their Mission 
Capabilities Statement (MISCAP), and if “adequate resources exist and is training 
available in order to accomplish and sustain the AEF mission(s)… the UTC assessments 
are used to determine the most effective force tasking. Effective management of Air 
Force resources requires accurate information at all levels.” (AFI_10-244, 2010).   
Squadron Commanders are responsible for “associating, tracking, and managing 
personnel and equipment in UTCs and assigning them to the proper AEF. The 
squadron/unit commander is the authority for status of the unit’s UTC(s)” (AFI_10-244, 
2010).   
 In ART, Commanders determine the assessment on the UTCs ability to meet the 
MISCAP, the completeness of the UTC based on the manpower and equipment the UTC 
is suppose to have and if the UTC is able to deploy within 72 hours of notification.  
Commanders rate their UTCs primarily using a color code system of green, yellow, or 
Red.  If all manpower, and equipment are available, can complete the MISCAP, and can 
deploy within 72 hours then UTC should be green.  AFI 10-244 directs that if the UTC is 
missing some of the manning or equipment it is suppose to have, or has a deficient 
condition, but can still meet the MISCAP, then it should assessed as yellow.  With the 
yellow rating, AFI 10-244 also directs Commanders to “provide a detailed explanation in 
remarks.  Describe the condition, the corrective action, and the get-well date.”  If a UTC 
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has missing or deficient equipment or manpower that prevents the UTC from meeting the 
MISCAP, then Commanders assess the UTC as Red.  Again, AFI 10-244 directs 
Commanders to remark on condition, corrective action, and get-well date, see Figure 8 
 
 Remarks are very important to effectively communicating a UTC’s status and 
enabling higher-level decision-making in support of the TPFDD requirements.  
Schedulers at AFPC/DPW do not have first hand knowledge of the personnel or 
equipment deviations in a Commanders assessment and must rely on the remarks to help 
Figure 8:  UTC Assessment Flow-Chart (AFI 10-244, 2010) 
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them decide if that UTC can still support a particular tasking.  For example a yellow UTC 
because only four of the required five people are available may not be allowed to fill a 
tasking that stipulates it must have the full 5-person team.  Likewise, a red UTC with 
only 3 of the 5 may still be able to fill a tasking requiring only one or two.  
Unfortunately, there are oversights in the guidance that results in an inconsistency in the 
perceptions of how to classify UTC’s and how to report additional comments.   
Interviews at all levels indicate a major problem with ART is inconsistency in 
ratings and remarks.  There is no Air Force level guidance that directs Commanders how 
to standardize their comments about UTC’s that are not rated as green.  If a UTC is 
limited due to a medical condition, the UTC would be rated yellow or red.  With that 
rating, guidance directs reporting the “condition, corrective action, and get well date”.  
This guidance is incomplete because it fails to properly direct “how” to report on 
condition.  ART has the ability to report the DAV, AAC or ALC, which according to an 
interview with the AFMC ART manager is the level of detail some Commanders stop at.  
This level of detail fails to capitalize on ART’s capabilities to communicate a UTC’s 
restrictions for higher-level decision-making.  In addition to a DAV, ALC, or AAC 
number, ART provides the ability to stratify what the nature of the limitation code is such 
as “medical”, or “personal”.  The Commander can then use the remarks section to help 
provide even more data, however without standardization of common remarks and 
definitions, higher level interpretation is spotty and unreliable.  Within AFMC, a 
MAJCOM memorandum was published directing use of AAC/DAV codes and remarks 
in ART (Huber, 2011), however ART is intended to be viewed and interpreted at an Air 
Force level such as AFPC/DPW, and there is no guidance directing standardization of the 
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product at their level. 
Another disconnect in ART reporting guidance became apparent during an 
interview with AFPC/DPW.  Current guidance states a “green” rating is given if the UTC 
meets the MISCAP and is able to deploy within 72 hours, it even states “in addition and 
independent of the stoplight (Green, Yellow, Red) assessment, each unit will indicate if a 
UTC is tasked to deploy and, if tasked, whether it can meet theater specific requirements 
including line remarks IAW timing criteria” (AFI_10-244, 2010).  However this guidance 
is not necessarily interpreted to mean assignment limitations.  There is differing opinions 
as to whether the guidance requires a UTC with an ALC-C1 to be rated green because it 
meets the MISCAP by the letter, or it should be rated yellow because even though it can 
fulfill the MISCAP, it is limited in it’s theater of employment. AFI 10-244’s “Art 
Monitor Checklist” further supports the confusion (see Appendix B).  Section 4 of the 
checklist asks if “members are free of non-waiverable DAV codes”.  If the answer is yes, 
it instructs the rating should be green.  Additionally, there appears to be very liberal use 
of the 72-hour availability.  Though it is possible to process a medical waiver from start 
to finish within 72-hours, it would not be possible to process more than a few within that 
timeframe.  The void in guidance here is if anything requiring a waiver should be 
considered green, yellow, or maybe even red.  This confusion, and the current state of 
inconsistent reporting results in an inability to positively differentiate a capability that can 
be called upon to rapidly deploy to anywhere in the world to fulfill it’s MISCAP, and one 
that must wait for a waiver and still be limited by location. 
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AEF Rotation Planning 
AFI 10-403 states “the AF goal is to provide the unit as much time as possible for 
a deployment tasking.”  AFPC is responsible for preparing the AEF rotation schedule and 
maintaining the master rotational TPFDD in DCAPES.  The rotational TPFDD is a 
revolving TPFDD of reoccurring requirements.  CCDR’s constantly evaluate their forces’ 
ability to meet the mission requirements and based on changes will initiate an ACR, 
RFF/RFC, or release forces.  Other than that, the rotational TPFDD will call for the 
forces necessary to maintain the current requirements.    “The [AFPC/DPW], with 
support of component headquarters, will conduct a review of force rotational 
requirements with line remarks prior to the start of each AEF cycle” (AFI_10-401, 2010).  
AFPC/DPW is also responsible for the planning of critical dates for each AEF TPFDD.  
There are a few dates of importance.  The Pivot Date is the date that each AEF rotation 
officially begins, “normally the 15th day of the first month of the AEF deployment 
eligibility window. The transportation movement window is 15-days on either side of the 
AEF pivot date” (AFI_10-401, 2010).  AFPC/DPW will work to plan so all forces are 
rotated within a 30-day window.  Typically key personnel will rotate towards the 
beginning of the window and the rest of the forces will phase in through the rest of the 
window.  Planning for the upcoming AEF begins 160 days before the pivot date for 4-
month and 191 days before pivot for 6-month rotations.  During that time AFPC, FAM’s, 
CCDR’s and the Joint Staff may all be involved in working out issues so that 
AFPC/DPW will have firm requirements and be able to implement sourcing on time.  
Sourcing is the process of identifying actual assets/names to fill TPFDD requirements.  
Sourcing begins approximately 123 days prior to pivot for 4-month rotations and 151 
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days prior to pivot for 6-month rotations (AFI_10-401, 2010).  Even though there appears 
to be a lot of time between sourcing and the date forces need to actually be arriving in 
theater, there is still a lot of planning and co-ordination that must take place such as 
tailoring movement plans for specific requirements.  This only allows planning for 
Figure 9: AEF Rotation Timelines (AFI 10-401, 2010) 
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approximately 9 days from the beginning of sourcing to completing sourcing, see Figure 
9.  
Types of Taskings 
There are standard and non-standard force requirements.  When the forces needed 
to meet a CCDR’s requirement aligns with an Air Force standard capability, such as a 
standard UTC in the AEF Library, it is referred to as a standard requirement, also known 
as Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS).  When a CCDR requirement does not align 
with an Air Force standard capability, the Air Force refers to them as Joint Expeditionary 
Taskings (JET).  In the Joint environment there are three types of taskings that are 
collectively referred to as JET by the Air Force.  Those three are the Joint Force 
Capability, In-Lieu of, and Ad Hoc sourcing solutions.   
Joint Capability sourcing is providing an Air Force capability in place of another 
services capability such as Red Horse substituting for Army Combat Engineers, where no 
additional special training is required (AFI_10-401, 2010).  
In-Lieu of (ILO) sourcing is using an Air Force capability to fill a hole in another 
services capability where the capabilities are not necessarily a clear-cut direct substitution 
such as sending an LRO to work as an Army S4, or an Air Force vehicle maintainer 
deploying to fill a motor pool position with the Army.  ILO can also be sourcing a “best 
fit” strategy where a standard capability can fill the requirement, but it is not necessarily 
working within its core competencies.  AFI 10-401 gives an example of a “Direct 
Support Supply Company, filled by Army reserve Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant Unit.” 
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AFI 10-401 describes Ad Hoc as “A consolidation of individuals and equipment 
from various commands/services forming a deployable/employable entity, properly 
manned, trained and equipped to meet the supported CCDR‘s requirements (e.g. 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) sourced with Navy & Air Force personnel).” 
There is one more type of sourcing for another type of requirement.   Individual 
Augmentees (IA) are intended to be temporary positions needed to support a Joint 
requirement.  IA’s must be routed through the Joint Staff and added to a Joint Manning 
Document.  These positions are levied to the different services as requirements.  AFI 10-
401 directs that IA’s should be temporary in nature and not to “address permanent 
manning or capability shortages.”  The Air Force will attempt to align IA requirements 
with existing AEF rotations to the maximum extent possible.  IA’s are tasked by AFPC 
through MilPDS using ECAST (AFI_10-401, 2010).  These are now the taskings 
primarily filled by Tempo Band-X. 
The Air Force also supports Indeterminate Temporary Duty (ITDY) requirements, 
commonly known as “365’s”.  These requirements are handled as assignments and are 
not included in this study. 
AEF Sourcing 
 There are several key players in sourcing an individual to fill a CCDR’s 
requirement.  At AFPC there are Schedulers, at the MAJCOM there are Functional Area 
Managers (FAM’s), at the installation there is an Installation Deployment Officer (IDO), 
Unit Commander, sometimes an installation/wing level Functional Manager, the 
Personnel Readiness Flight, and the Manpower Office.  Schedulers are assigned based on 
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functional specialties.  Schedulers are familiar with the capabilities their functional areas 
provide and how they are leveraged to meet CCDR requirements.  MAJCOM Functional 
Managers are responsible for tracking the MAJCOM’s capabilities in their functional 
area and maintaining awareness on the status of those forces as well as controlling 
tasking actions affecting them.  The IDO is the installation’s interface with DCAPES for 
receiving tasking notifications, and coordinating all deployment actions from tasking to 
departure of forces.  Sometimes UTCs or requirements span more than a single unit on 
the installation, in these situations it is common to have a single functional manager for 
all of those forces on the installation.  Examples would be assigning a Supply Chief to 
manage all supply AFSC’s on the installation, or having a Group Chief manage the TCN 
escort taskings.  The Personnel Readiness Flight (PRF) is responsible for providing 
information on reporting instructions, assisting with reclamas, and actually associating a 
name/SSN with a tasking in DCAPES.  The Unit Commander is responsible for weighing 
their first-person knowledge of their UTCs and personnel against the requirements to 
determine if a) the member can fulfill the requirements, and b) the ability of the Unit to 
function should the UTC be deployed.    
Sourcing is the process of taking a TPFDD requirement and then identifying, and 
tasking the actual force that will deploy to fill the requirement.  Ultimately for UTCs with 
manpower requirements, a “face” will be assigned to actual spaces in DCAPES.  The 
AFPC/DPW is responsible for managing the process.  Sourcing begins at AFPC/DPW 
with a requirement.  For the purpose of this study, the requirement will be sourced in one 
of two methods depending on what type of requirement it is.  With few exceptions such 
as some Ad Hoc requirements, if the requirement is for an Individual Augmentee (a form 
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of JET), or for “any AFSC” (which does not include requirements for Third Country 
National [TCN] escorts), then AFPC/DPW will source the forces necessary to fill the 
requirement directly using MilPDS.  For the purpose of this study it will be referred to as 
sourcing by name.  All other taskings should be able to be filled with standard UTC’s 
postured in their normal AEF buckets (tempo bands A-E).  In this case, AFPC/DPW tasks 
individual units to source the forces (AFPC/DPWS, 2012).  For the purpose of this study 
this will be referred to as UIC/UTC sourcing.  This study will not include ITDY, Senior 
Staff or Commander sourcing. 
 Sourcing by name begins at AFPC/DPW with a requirement for an IA, “any 
AFSC”, or select other type.  Within AFPC, there are functional schedulers.  These 
individuals use ECAST to view requirements, and pull up a listing of possible candidates 
to fill the requirement.  For these taskings, AFPC will use ART and MilPDS data to 
evaluate the candidates.  At this stage AFPC is looking at individuals and their service 
records to select candidates based on, first, the capability to meet requirement. Second, 
the number of contingency deployments they have (fewer goes to the top of the list). 
Finally, the short tour return date (oldest date goes to the top of the list).  When initially 
looking at candidates, ECAST will show all candidates regardless of the ART color 
coding.  According to the Deputy of AEF Scheduling at AFPC/DPWS, it is up to the 
scheduler to evaluate each candidate based on the remarks in ART, if a red UTC is on the 
top of the list and has a get well date that will meet the requirement, then that is the 
individual that should be tasked (AFPC/DPWS, 2012).  Once the scheduler selects the 
candidate, they “task” the individual by SSN to fill the requirement.  Notification of the 
tasking is then sent to the member’s MAJCOM for tasking verification.  For this type of 
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sourcing, the MAJCOM’s process is called “verification” however the only MAJCOM 
action taken at this stage is changing the coding and making it visible to the members 
owning installation.  Once the Installation Deployment Officer (IDO) receives the 
notification, the IDO briefs the Unit Commander and verifies the member’s ability to 
meet the deployment requirements.  If it is possible for the member to meet, or have a 
limitation waived that would allow them to meet the requirements of the tasking, the Unit 
verifies the tasking.  If the Unit and or member cannot support the tasking they fill out a 
Reclama.   An approved Reclama, for this type of tasking causes the AFPC Scheduler to 
begin all over again by evaluating possible candidates from across the Air Force, see 
Figure 10.  Reclama’s and waivers will be discussed later. 
Sourcing by UIC/UTC begins at AFPC/DPW with a requirement.  The AEF 
scheduler uses ECAST to populate a list of candidates to fill the requirement.  ECAST 
populates a list of candidates based on Forward Operating Location (FOL) teaming.  FOL 
teaming is a strategy to pull forces from a common geographic location to fill 
requirements to a common forward operating location.  This concept is intended to 
improve aggregation and transportation.  All UTC’s in the FOL team will randomly 
populate the ECAST listing of possible candidates.  The Deputy Director of 
AFPC/DPWS states the scheduler then evaluates the first UTC on the list for its ability to 
meet the requirements.  The top UTC could be a Red UTC because 3 of 5 personnel are 
missing, but the CCDR requirement may only need 2 people, then the UTC would be 
sourced even though it is Red.  On the other hand, a green UTC may pop to the top of the 
list but a CCDR line remark may require a special experience indicator (SEI).  In this 
case there is a decision point, the scheduler must either attempt to communicate with   
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FAM’s to find a capability with the SEI and move down the list until a UTC with the SEI 
is identified, or decide to either just source a UTC not knowing the status and risk 
sourcing a capability that will a waiver or reclama.  Supporting this decision point can 
arguably be the most important function of ART’s ability to effectively communicate the 
status of UTC’s.  This decision point is made above the MAJCOM, on day zero of 
sourcing.  It needs to be supported by terminology and status reporting practices that are 
standard across the Air Force, therefore any MAJCOM supplementation regarding this 
purpose is considered ineffective.  
Figure 10:  By Name Sourcing Process 
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 Once the Scheduler selects a UIC/UTC to fill the requirement, it flows to the 
MAJCOM via DCAPES.  The MAJCOM’s readiness division coordinates with the 
MAJCOM functional manager who verifies whether the requirement can be supported.  If 
the MAJCOM determines the unit can support the tasking, it verifies the tasking and 
makes it visible to the installation.  At the installation, the IDO confers with the Unit CC 
and any others deemed necessary to determine the member’s ability to fill the 
requirements.  If the Unit Commander determines the member can fill the requirement, 
and that the Unit can support the loss, the Unit accepts (verifies) the tasking.  If the 
member has any limitation that will expire before the requirement begins, or any other 
limitations that can possibly be waved such as an ALC-C2 or needing CCDR waiver to a 
line remark, then the Unit verifies the tasking and initiates necessary waivers.  The key 
here is that CCDR line remark waivers are sought prior to verification and assigning a 
name in DCAPES, while medical waivers are not necessarily accomplished prior to 
verification.  See Figure 11 for AFPC/DPW sourcing process, Figure 12 for UIC/UTC 
sourcing process & Figure 13 for Wing/Unit level sourcing decisions.  
If the forces available to the Unit Commander have a limitation, or there are 
restrictions placed upon the requirement by the CCDR that prevents the Unit Commander 
from filling the requirement, they must request a waiver before attempting to submit a 
reclama.  If the condition preventing the Unit from filling the requirement is due to 
CCDR restrictions, “the tasked commander will request the deployed group commander 
waive the requirement that precludes the unit from filling the tasking (e.g., line remarks, 
special experience identifier (SEI), grade, skill level, etc.) or expand substitution rules 
that will meet the UTC’s MISCAP” (AFI_10-401, 2010).  This waiver is initiated  
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 Figure 12: UIC/UTC Sourcing Process 
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Figure 13: Wing/Unit Level Sourcing (AFI_10-403, 2008) 
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through the IDO and the PRF.  The CCDR has 5 days to accept the request and update 
the requirements in the TPFDD, or 3 days when the requirement is within 30 days of first 
movement.  If the TPFDD is not updated within the timeframe, the waiver is considered 
denied, and the IDO may submit the reclama.   
 When the limitation is due to an AAC/ALC/DAV for a medical condition, a 
medical waiver must be submitted.  The Commander directs the member to initiate a 
medical waiver through the member’s MTF.  The MTF evaluates the member’s 
condition, the tasking location, and the COCOM’s guidance to determine initial 
eligibility for a waiver.  If the MTF believes fulfilling the tasking does not put the 
member at undo risk with regards to their current medical condition(s) and treatment 
plans, the MTF follows the specific waiver submission guidelines directed by the 
tasking’s COCOM/AF Component Command.  For AFCENT, the waiver package and 
guidance directs MTF’s can disapprove a member for deployment, but cannot approve a 
member for deployment.  It also directs that normally, waivers should be submitted no 
earlier than 90-days prior to first movement (USAFCENT/SG, 2012). The AFCENT 
Surgeon General has been delegated authority to approve CENTCOM waivers for all but 
behavioral conditions.  The AFCENT SG evaluates the waiver request, and approves, 
disapproves, or forwards the waiver to CENTCOM for final approval/disapproval as 
needed.  This process is used for all medical clearances whether they are for conditions 
known prior to the tasking, or conditions that arise during the tasking. According to an 
interview with AFCENT/SG, a major cause of waivers requiring CENTCOM/SG review 
is for psychotropic drugs.  Any medication that has mind altering effects requires a 
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waiver by CENTCOM/SG unless the member has been on the drug long enough to 
establish a history of no negative side effects.    
 Unit/Wing Commanders must seek all avenues to meet a UIC/UTC tasking.  Even 
if the individual assigned cannot meet the requirement, they must attempt to receive 
waivers to requirements and limitations as well as explore the Unit/Wing’s ability to 
substitute other forces (within the same vulnerability period) to meet the requirement.  
Ultimately though, reclama’s can result from any reason the Unit Commander feels 
prevents the Unit from meeting the requirement.   A reclama is justified “when a wing or 
tasked unit does not possess sufficient or qualified personnel to support a crisis tasking, 
the deployed commander is unable to waive the requirement, or the tasking is impossible 
to meet or will shut down critical elements of the home- station mission, as determined 
by the wing commander or equivalent” (AFI_10-401, 2010).   
There are 5 categories of Reclama’s.  Condition 1 is when there is “insufficient 
authorized (1A), assigned (1B), eligible (1C), qualified (1D), or trained (1E) personnel” 
(AFI_10-401, 2010) available.  Condition 2 is when there is insufficient equipment.  
Condition 3 is when there is “no capability available in the on-call AEF” (AFI_10-401, 
2010).  Condition 4 is if the desired capability is not “inherent” in the tasked unit.  
Finally, Condition 5 is when the tasked Unit (unit/wing/MAJCOM as appropriate) has the 
capability, “but deployment of personnel would cause a severe adverse impact on the 
wing/unit mission” (AFI_10-401, 2010). 
Reclama processing has it’s own separate electronic system for submission, 
routing, approval and tracking. From the installation, the reclama goes to the MAJCOM.  
The MAJCOM will evaluate the reclama to make sure the installation did everything 
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possible to fill the requirement such as requesting a CCDR waiver or requesting a 
medical waiver for the limitations.  The MAJCOM will approve or disapprove the Unit’s 
reclama.  If the MAJCOM approves the reclama, then the MAJCOM seeks alternate 
avenues to fill the requirement from within the MAJCOM.  If the MAJCOM cannot meet 
the requirements, it forwards the reclama to AFPC.  At AFPC, the sourcing process 
repeats itself until a successful tasking is made, or all AF capabilities are exhausted.  If 
AFPC determines the AF cannot meet the requirement, AFPC submits a shortfall to the 
AF Operations Group, HAF Crisis Action Team, and the ACC Operations Group, 
(AFI_10-401, 2010).  However, before AFPC submits a shortfall they will coordinate 
with the HAF FAM to develop  “a mitigation plan that utilizes a combination of (1) full 
or unused portions of fragged or tailored UTCs from the available Enabler libraries, (2) 
UTCs from the next AEF block/pair, (3) mobilized ARC forces, and/or (4) AFSCs from 
the Institutional Force, in the current AEF vulnerability period, that could be aggregated 
into a UTC” (AFI_10-401, 2010).  Reaching forward to the next AEF bucket to source 
forces is strategy initiated across the entire functional area AF-wide.  At the Unit/Wing 
level, “personnel swaps between AEF pairs are discouraged and require MAJCOM/CV or 
equivalent approval” (AFI_10-401, 2010).   
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to use existing literature, on-site training, and 
personal interviews to discover the process of how a Combatant Commander requirement 
flows through the process of being assigned to a service.  How requirements assigned to 
the Air Force are sorted.  How the Air Force structures itself to meet the requirements, 
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and how the Air Force ultimately tasks a specific individual to fill the tasking.  This 
chapter attempted to identify parallel processes and deviations such as the Reclama and 
medical waiver processes, as well as some peculiarities such as the fact that FOL teaming 
is integral in the strategy of sourcing, but the current process and manning structure 
dictates MAJCOMs attempt to find substitutions before forwarding reclamas back to 
AFPC…a process that undoubtedly reduces FOL teamed substitution options.  Another 
peculiarity is the 30-60 day gap between verifying a tasking and requesting the medical 
waiver (at least as written).  It also explored definitions and classifications supporting 
critical decision points in the various processes. 
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
This chapter will build on the information gained during the process discovery by 
providing tools that should be helpful tying everything together and it will provide visual 
representations useful in analyzing the entire network of processes for improvement 
opportunities.  It will use the information gathered during the process discovery and the 
available data to create a supply chain map of the Class-0 supply item.  The supply chain 
map will be a simplified version of the “Extended Value Stream Map”.  According to the 
information gathered so far, the planning cycle’s target lead-time for tasking warfighters 
is between 123 days and 151 days.  The Air Force standard for tasking verification is at 
most 15 days, data shows this standard is met 89% of the time.  This indicates time 
constraints are not likely to be a major contributor when evaluating the process with the 
purpose of identifying area’s that result in failure to successfully fulfill CCDR 
requirements or to decrease the “warehouse refusal” or “inventory accuracy” metrics 
which indicate the Air Force’s true knowledge of the status of it’s resources as well as it’s 
ability to successfully task those resources on the first attempt.  Therefore, the map will 
not contain time, nor will it attempt to cast judgment on value or non-value added sub-
processes.  It will simply be a conceptual map of the overall process to enable a broad 
process-wide visualization of the current state.  A simplified representation of 
relationships should provide leadership enough information to identify questionable areas 
for potential improvements.  Next, the available data will be digested to populate a 
statistical probability decision tree.  The decision tree will provide a tool to analyze the 
probabilities of various sourcing outcomes based on current probabilities.  It will also 
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provide the ability to change various characteristics to analyze the effects that targeted 
efforts or adjusted goals in different area’s will have on the final sourcing probabilities.    
  
Supply Chain Maps 
Based on the information gathered during the Process Discovery, three supply 
chain maps were developed.  The first map is of the planning process, the second map is 
of how requirements are fulfilled, and the third map is presented as a possible future state 
after incorporating changes suggested though the course of the study as possible 
improvements; see Appendix C for the conceptual Supply Chain Maps.  These maps are 
simplified in an attempt to provide basic conceptual relationships and process flow.  
While all members of the supply chain may be capable of communication or interaction 
with each other, they are not illustrated unless they are a primary process flow. 
 All three maps are essentially the same with only minor changes based on what 
portion of the process is being looked at.  First is the Deployment Planning Supply Chain 
Map. Building the map by beginning with the customer and working backwards, the 
customer is identified as the COCOM.  The COCOM was chosen over breaking it out to 
the CCDR’s for a couple of reasons.  First, CCDR’s are subordinate to their COCOM’s 
creating a “parent/child” relationship.  This analogy is used similar to the mapping of a 
product targeting children, but is purchased by the parent such as a sugary breakfast 
cereal.  The child is the real customer, but the decisions of the parent are what must be 
evaluated as the final customer because they are the one actually purchasing the good.  
Second, mapping to the CCDR’s would create too much chaos to provide any inputs of 
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value to the purpose of these maps.  Since COCOM’s are ultimately responsible for their 
CCDR’s and the requirements CCDR’s request, they are mapped as the customer.  
Stratifying the COCOM’s as individual icons on the map also does not provide any value 
for the purpose of this map, therefore they are simplified into one because the planning 
and sourcing communication links are sufficiently identical at this level of analysis.  
 Directly upstream of the customers during the planning phase is the HAF & JCS.  
Their functions intertwine a great deal and for the purpose of this study, representing 
them as one entity accomplishes the intent.  The HAF & JCS actually act as e-retailers in 
the supply chain.  They do not actually handle the goods, they merely promote, and sell 
the warfighters capabilities.  The HAF & JCS are the point of contact with the customer.  
This is where demand management and customer relationship management can be the 
most effective.  The HAF & JCS are where customer demands can be tempered and 
managed to help “sell” standardized solutions and reduce customized requirements.  
Increasing the standardized proportion of requirements that adhere to standardized 
capabilities in turn decreases irregular sourcing processes as well as requirements that are 
customized by line remarks.  Fewer line remarks means fewer reclamas for line remarks.  
Customer demand is relayed to AFPC through the EDI systems discussed in Chapter 3.  
 AFPC acts as an electronic distributor in the Planning SCM.  AFPC is the keeper 
of the AEF Library and with it all AEF Capabilities.  They are also the pivot point where 
all customer requirements converge with supplier capabilities.  During planning AFPC 
takes new customer orders from the JCS in the form of approved tasking orders based on 
approved RFF’s and ACR’s.  AFPC also interacts with the AFCC’s and COCOM’s to 
update the Master AEF TPFDD of all recurring requirements.  In effect, this is a form of 
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“standing order” placed by the customer.  During the planning phase, AFPC takes inputs 
from the MAJCOMs regarding the status of capabilities.  The MAJCOMs also play the 
role as a distributor (except for forces their own indigenous forces).  MAJCOMs 
consolidate the inputs of the individual units and offer their capabilities to AFPC.  The 
Units are mapped as manufacturers because they take various inputs of raw materials in 
the form of manpower and are responsible for producing the warfighter with the 
capabilities concurrent with the their skill and grade.  They also package those 
warfighters in UTC’s for presentation to the customer.  During planning, the Units 
interface with the MTF’s to evaluate the medical status of their warfighters.  For medical 
conditions expected to last more than 12 months, the MTFs interface with AFPC for 
medical evaluation of the warfighters.  This information is then referred back to the Units 
for the purpose of updating capabilities.  A Unit’s list of capabilities can be thought of as 
a supplier’s list of what is in stock.   The portion of the supply chain process illustrated 
on this map can be thought of as taking customer orders for future deliveries and creating 
manufacturing/distribution plans to meet customer requirements.  The next map 
illustrates the execution of those manufacturing/distribution plans. 
 The second map illustrates the requirements fulfillment process.   This process 
begins with the JCS issuing a tasking order to AFPC.  AFPC then uses ECAST to 
interface with ART statuses consolidated by the MAJCOMs and MilPDS data provided 
by the individual units (wings) to determine which units/individuals (depending on 
sourcing method) possess the capabilities necessary to fill the customer orders.  Once 
AFPC determines which manufacturer to order the capability from, they send their order 
to the MAJCOMs.  The MAJCOMs process the order and forward it on to the units.  At 
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this stage, the units have the task of fulfilling the orders, however currently this task is 
complicated by the fact that the method of reporting their “in-stock” capabilities does not 
allow enough detail for AFPC to match requirements to actual capabilities accurately.  
For instance, UTC capabilities reported may require a CGO, however the grade of the 
CGO as directed in the UTC’s MISCAP is insignificant.  Unfortunately, sometimes 
CCDR’s tailor their requirements with line remarks directing the CGO be a Captain, but 
the unit was posturing a 2nd Lieutenant in the UTC.  This is only one example of how 
insufficient data describing UTC’s “in-stock” results in poor sourcing decisions.  To use a 
vehicle analogy, it would be like shopping for a new pick-up truck on line but not being 
able to see whether they were 2-wheel drive or 4-wheel drive until after you submit the 
order and wait a week.  Sometimes it does not matter what kind of truck you get, but 
sometimes you may need a 4-wheel drive and the manufacturer only has 2-wheel drives.  
If the unit’s do not have the exact capabilities requested by the customer, they then 
communicate directly with the final customer to see if they will relax their requirements 
and take delivery of a product that does not meet their initial requirements.  Another 
problem the unit may run into while filling orders from AFPC is created by the practice 
of posturing capabilities as “in stock” when in actuality, those units are controlled by an 
unpredictable medical waiver process.  Before a unit can fill an order with a capability 
that has a medical restriction, they must receive permission from the medical community.  
The problem is that this process of obtaining permission has a high failure rate (discussed 
later).  In essence, the units were posturing capabilities that were not theirs to posture.  In 
a supply chain sense, the MTF’s actually stock those assets and the units must order the 
assets from the MTF’s.  This illustrates the fact that MTF’s are actually in the supply 
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chain as manufacturers who supply warfighters with medical restrictions to the units.  
Realizing this, it becomes apparent that units are reporting capabilities as “in stock” that 
must actually be ordered from another manufacturer.  This presents a problem for 
reliability of the reported capabilities as well as for rapid mobility.  If the unit must order 
the assets from the MTF, then those assets are not readily available.  In practice, the unit 
is actually relaying a capability status.  The MTF’s communicate statuses of the 
capabilities they offer to the units through the use of physical profiles, ALC’s, and 
ACC’s.  These statuses are currently coded in such a manner that is resulting in sufficient 
miscommunication that it contributes to the single largest cause of failed sourcing 
attempts.  The third SCM will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
   
Statistical Probability Decision Tree  
The purpose of the Statistical Probability Decision Tree is to provide a numerical 
representation of how various actions affect the goal of being able to successfully 
identify, task, and deploy a warfighter that meets the CCDR’s requirements on the first 
attempt.  This goal provides an indication of how accurately the Air Force can account 
for its inventory of warfighters.  This level of inventory accuracy directly relates to the 
level of resource utilization, impacts the “safety stock” of warfighters necessary, and 
affects the accuracy of Air Force capability forecasts when conducting contingency and 
crisis planning.  Due to the fact that the goal is tasking warfighters on the first try, 
substitutions and UIC changes are not included in this decision tree as they are remedial 
actions and have no bearing on the goal.   
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To assist in modeling the decision tree, an Excel add-in called “Tree Plan” was 
used to create the map.  The model uses events and branches.  Events are simply decision 
points and the branches are the results of the decision points.  The branches are modeled 
such that the top left cell is the branch probability and below that is the name of the 
branch.  All branches stemming from a single event are mutually exclusive and their 
probabilities sum to one.  The bottom left cell indicates the total probability of that 
branch and the bottom right cell is the expected value of sourcing attempts realized at that 
branch calculated by multiplying total probability by initial sourcing attempts input at the 
start.  There is insufficient data to enable more in-depth analysis of individual 
probabilities and their dependencies on upstream events, therefore it is necessary at this 
stage to calculate total probabilities based on an assumption of independence.  Assuming 
independence, the total probability of a branch is calculated by multiplying the 
probability of the branch by the total probability of the event from which the branch is 
derived.  The total probability of the event is the same as the probability of the upstream 
branch to which it is associated. Events are numbered top to bottom, left to right 
beginning at the first decision point.  Branches are bulleted so that the number of the 
branch reflects the entire decision path leading to the branch. 
The decision tree allows the user to change probabilities at any point in the chain 
of events to experiment with how various changes impact the final outcome given a set 
input.  The user may also change the number of attempted taskings to simulate an 
expected outcome given set probabilities. To simulate an actual AEF tasking scenario, the 
user can input a number under in block 1 “Tasking Attempts” that is representative of the 
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number of requirements to be tasked, the final output represents the expected number of 
warfighters for each different type of result. 
The start is the far left block, which allows the user to input the number of 
sourcing attempts to simulate.  This study will use the data presented to the AFMC/CV 
on 4 November 2011 (AFMC/CV, 2011) to derive initial estimates of probabilities.  The 
total number of sourcing attempts will be estimated by the total number of taskings 
(21,290) plus the total number of known failures (2099), which results in an input of 
23,389. 
The first event is whether the tasking is sourced by name or by UIC/UTC.  There 
are two branches from this event.  Branch 1 is By Name Sourcing and Branch 2 is 
UIC/UTC sourcing.  With currently available data, the remaining model of events and 
branches for Branch 1 mirrors Branch 2.  There is no data to derive a proportion of 
taskings sourced via name or UIC/UTC, therefore for this study the proportion will be set 
to 100% UIC/UTC and 0% By Name.  For this initial study, setting the proportion at this 
branch to 100/0 has no effect on final summaries and keeps the analysis of the given data 
simplified.  Future collection of data broken out by type of sourcing will allow more 
precise analysis of system performance.  Analyzing system performance based on tasking 
method would support future improvement efforts that wish to evaluate which method of 
sourcing provides the best results. For now, the 100/0 proportion causes the current 
model to return an expected value of zero for the entire By Name structure.   
Following the UIC/UTC branch, the next event (2) has two branches. Branch 1.1 
is if the UTC that is trying to be sourced meets the tasking requirements.  Branch 1.2 is 
the UTC’s that do not meet the tasking requirements.   The equation used to determine 
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the probability for Branch 1.1 is derived using known values of total Condition 5 
reclamas, and the known number of total successful taskings, which includes the 
estimated number of approved COCOM medical waivers that are estimated by the 
AFCENT/SG data.  Estimating COCOM medical waivers is discussed later.  Branch 1.1 
includes Condition 5 reclamas and known successful taskings minus the estimation of 
“Approved COCOM Waivers”, therefore the formula used to derive the branch 
probability is 
                                                                        
                      
.  
This results in a branch probability of .9045, and a total probability of .9045.  Branch 
1.2’s estimated probability is calculated as 1-P(Branch 1.1) which provides a probability 
of .0955 and a total probability of .0955.   
If the UTC meets the tasking requirements, the next event (4) has Branch 1.1.1, 
which is if the Unit is unable to support the tasking, which leads to Branch 1.1.1.1, a 
Condition 5 Reclama. The branch probability of a Condition 5 Reclama is estimated by 
                          
             
                     
 which results in a branch probability of .0125 and when 
multiplied by the total probability of the Branch 1.1, it yields the total probability of a 
Condition 5 Reclama to be .0113.   
Branch 1.1.2 is “Unit Verifies Tasking”, this represents a sourcing attempt that is 
ultimately verified by the unit and a name/names are placed in the system.  Branch 
1.1.2’s probability is estimated as 1-P(Branch 1.1.1), which results in a probability of 
.9875 and a total probability of .8932. 
The next event (8) after Branch 1.1.2 leads to Branch 1.1.2.1 “Member 
Successfully Deploys” and Branch 1.1.2.2 “Post Tasking Incident Prevents Deployment”.  
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There is no data available to determine how many successfully tasked individuals still 
result in a reclama due to unforeseen circumstances before they can deploy, therefore 
until data is available, the probability of Branch 1.1.2.1 is set to 1, and the probability of 
branch 1.1.2.2 is set to zero.  Branch 1.1.2.1’s branch probability multiplied by the total 
probability of its upstream branch yields a total probability of .8932.  For future 
applications, the model continues with another event (14) to stratify “Post Tasking 
Incidents” with Branch 1.1.2.2.1 “Medical Reclama Post Verification” and Branch 
1.1.2.2.2 “Other Post Verification Reclama”.  Currently these probabilities are 
downstream of a zero probability and non-applicable, however this could be very 
insightful data for decision makers as it would indicate the number of medical and other 
reclamas that occur after individuals are notified of an impending deployment. 
Going back to the event Branch 1.2 “Member Doesn’t Meet Requirements”, the 
equation estimating this branch’s probability was 1-P(Branch 1.1).  This equation results 
in a branch probability of .0955.  The event (5) following this branch has four branches 
representing different reasons for a reclama and one branch that leads to various 
medically related outcomes.  There is no data available representing true Air Force 
reclama rates, however the AFMC data breaks out reclamas by seven different causes.  
They are Medical, Personnel Action, Line Remarks, Inaccurate ART, 3-Day Option, 
Other, and Condition 5.  The 3-Day option is only applicable to ITDY’s and therefore not 
included in this decision tree.  Due to a lack of AF-Level data, the AFMC data (n=238) 
will be used as an estimation of AF probabilities.   
The equations for Branches 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, and 1.2.5 all root from the same 
estimation of AF reclama probabilities based on AFMC reclama probabilities calculated 
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as  
                         
                                                             
 .  Due to the fact that there are 
downstream branches that do not result in reclamas, it is necessary to subtract the 
Expected Value (EV) for all downstream non-reclama branches from the EV of the 
upstream branch (1.2) prior to multiplying the reclama probabilities derived from the 
AFMC data by the upstream EV of Branch 1.2.  Once an EV for branches 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 
1.2.4, and 1.2.5 are calculated based on an input that does not include downstream non-
reclama outcomes, the branch EV’s can then be divided by the actual EV of their 
upstream branch to determine initial estimates their true branch probabilities.  This 
equation results in a Branch 1.2.2 “Line Remark Reclama” probability of .1874 and total 
probability of .0179.  Branch 1.2.3 “Personnel Action Reclama’s” probability is .2512 
and has a total probability of .024.  Branch 1.2.4 “Inaccurate ART Reclama’s” 
probability is .017 and has a total probability of .0016.  Branch 1.2.5 “Other Reclama’s” 
probability is .017 and also has a total probability of  .0016. 
Branch 1.2.1 “Medical”, contains the possibility of various outcomes therefore, 
the equation estimating the branch probability for Branch 1.2.1 is 
                    .  This equation results in a branch probability of .5274 and a 
total probability of .0503. 
The event (9) following Branch 1.2.1 consists of Branch 1.2.1.1 “MTF Approves 
Waiver”, and Branch 1.2.1.2 “Reclama-MTF Denies Waiver”.  Data is not collected to 
track the number of MTF waiver applications, nor the percentage of MTF waivers that 
are approved, or disapproved.  Finally, there is no data tracked that directly states average 
MTF Waiver Accuracy.  MTF Waiver Accuracy would be defined as the % of MTF 
waivers that are approved, which are subsequently approved by the COCOM.  This 
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metric could prove valuable in assessing the medical waiver processes effective 
communication between Medical Doctors at Base Level and their COCOM counterparts 
as well as an indication of the processes overall efficiency.  Fortunately, enough data is 
available to derive an initial estimation of the probabilities of MTF Waiver Approval and 
Disapproval.  It is assumed that all medical reclamas are submitted for a waiver.  Given 
the AEF Data from AFMC’s AEF Debrief and probabilities established thus far, it is 
determined that there are approximately 1,177.6915 tasking attempts splitting between 
Branch 1.2.1.1 and 1.2.1.2.  Based on data obtained from AFCENT/SG (representing 
CENTCOM), there were 464 waivers submitted during the same time as the AFMC data.  
Of those submissions, 396 were approved and 66 were denied.  That data is not a 
conclusive estimate of total AF COCOM waiver submissions because it does not include 
the other COCOM’s, however CENTCOM is the largest customer of warfighters and 
should provide a rough initial estimate of the true COCOM waiver data.  The true total 
COCOM waiver submissions will be higher than the estimated, which means the true 
MTF Waiver Approval probability will also be higher than estimated.  Given an input of 
1,177.6915 and an output of Branch 1.2.1.1 of 464, an MTF Waiver Approval probability 
is derived as .394, with a total probability of .0198.  The Branch 1.2.1.2 “Reclama-MTF 
Denies Waiver” probability is established as 1-P(MTF Waiver Approval) which is .606.  
This gives a total probability of .0305 that a sourcing attempt will result in an MTF 
medical waiver denial. 
If the MTF approves the waiver, the next event (13) sends the waiver to the 
COCOM for approval/disapproval.  There are two branches, Branch 1.2.1.1.1 “COCOM 
Approves Waiver” and Branch 1.2.1.1.2 “Reclama-COCOM Denies Waiver”.  The 
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probabilities of these branches were estimated using all available AFCENT/SG waiver 
data (n=820).  Based on those data, the branch probability that COCOM approves the 
waiver is estimated to be .8578, resulting in a total probability of .0170.  Branch 
1.2.1.1.2’s probability is estimated as 1-P(COCOM approves waiver) which is .1422, 
resulting in a total probability of .0028.    
The event (16) following COCOM Waiver Approval has two branches.  Branch 
1.2.1.1.1.1 “Member Successfully Deploys” and Branch 1.2.1.1.1.2 “Post Tasking 
Incident Prevents Deployment”.  Again, there is no data to enable developing 
probabilities for these branches, therefore all successful COCOM waivers will be 
assumed to successfully deploy.  This sets Branch 1.2.1.1.1.1’s probability to 1, and 
results in a total probability of .0170, and sets Branch 1.2.1.1.1.2’s probability as well as 
its total probability to zero.  This is an area lacking metrics that could provide useful 
information if tracked.  Being aware of when incidents occur in the chain of events may 
present trends or other obvious opportunities to focus future research or improvement 
efforts.  For example, AFPC/DPAMM, the Medical Standards and Retention Branch may 
find it useful to know how post tasking incident rates vary between the warfighters that 
were initially verified as ready to deploy and warfighters that were already medically 
limited for some other reason prior to tasking.  For future applications supporting that 
purpose, the model continues with another event (18) to stratify “Post Tasking Incidents” 
with Branch 12.1.1.1.2.1 “Medical Reclama Post COCOM Waiver” and Branch 
1.2.1.1.1.2.2 “Other Post COCOM Waiver Reclama”.  Both of those branches are 
downstream of a zero probability and therefore currently non applicable. 
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This completes all of the events mapped downstream of Branch 1 “UIC/UTC 
Sourcing”.  Currently there is no data to support making the events downstream of 
Branch 2 “By Name Sourcing” any different than Branch 1.  Therefore, all events and 
branch probabilities downstream of Branch 2 are identical to all events and branch 
probabilities downstream of Branch 1.  Due to the fact that Branch 2’s probability is 
currently zero, all downstream total probabilities are also zero.  Future research to gather 
data and differentiate the events and probabilities downstream of Branch 1 and 2 would 
provide valuable insight towards discovering the most effective and efficient method of 
tasking.  See Appendix C for the Statistical Probabilities Decision Tree. 
Utilizing the above described decision tree and inputting data from AFMC’s AEF 
debrief (AFMC/CV, 2011), the model was run with an input of 23,389.  Given that input, 
it successfully duplicated the known total number of Air Force Tasking successes  
 
(21,290) and reclamas, recorded as failures (2099) as well as maintained proper reclama 
ratios.  From the summary of this simulation (see Table 1), valuable data indicating 
opportunities for improvement are evident.  Immediately evident is a success rate of only 
SUMMARY
Attempts 23389 Condition	5 264 COCOM	Waivers	Denied	 66
Success 21290 Medical	Reclama 779.6915 MTF	Waivers	Denied 713.6915
Fail 2099 Line	Remarks 418.38 COCOM	Waiver	Approval	% 85.80%
Total	(should	=	attempts) 23389 Personnel	Actions 560.9595 MTF	Waiver	Approval	Accuracy	≈	COCOM	Approval	%
Success	Rate 0.910256958 Inaccurate	ART 37.9845
Other 37.9845
Post	Tasking	Incident 0
Table 1: Statistical Probability Decision Tree Summary 
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91% (this differs from the rates quoted in the introduction because it excludes some types 
of tasking methods).  Also evident are the major impact reclamas are having on the 
success rate.  Personnel Actions, and Medical Reclamas, and Line Remarks comprise 
83% of all tasking failures, which is surprising because except for the unknown number 
of post validation medical and personnel action reclamas, as well as the fact that ART 
status changes are suppose to be updated within 24 hours, all conditions contributing to 
the failures should be known when the decision to attempt to source that specific 
name/UIC/UTC is made.  This model also presents the first ever estimation of MTF 
Waiver Denial rates, which while the estimate is known to be high due to a low estimate 
of true AF COCOM waiver submissions, the fact that a 25% underestimation of the true 
COCOM Waiver submission rate would only change the MTF Waiver Denial rate from 
61% to 51% indicates that the MTF is actually bearing the most significant load with 
regards to medical screening.   
While investigating the branches downstream of Branch 1.2.1 “Medical”, another 
metric can be derived.  The ratio of total successful outcomes stemming from Branch 
Table 2: Simulation of 95% Medical Success 
SUMMARY
Attempts 23389 Medical	Reclama 58.88458 COCOM	Waivers	Denied	 0
Success 22010.80693 Personnel	Actions 560.9595 MTF	Waivers	Denied 58.88458
Fail 1378.193075 Line	Remarks 418.38 Total	Medical	Waivers	Approved 1118.807
Total	(should	=	attempts) 23389 Condition	5 264 COCOM	Waiver	Approval	% 85.80%
Success	Rate 0.94107516 Inaccurate	ART 37.9845 MTF	Waiver	Approval	Accuracy	≈	COCOM	Approval	%
Other 37.9845
Post	Tasking	Incident 0
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1.2.1 to unsuccessful outcomes would represent a probability of successful deployment 
given a need for a medical waiver.  The simulation of one AEF based on AFMC’s data 
(AFMC/CV, 2011), results in a medical success rate of 389/1177.69, which is only 
33.79%, resulting in 779.69 sourcing attempt failures.  This model allows manipulation 
of probabilities to enable visualization of effects that various improvements or changes 
will have on the final outcome.  Should an attempt to improve the medical success rate 
decide to target various goals, those goals can be set to view the outcome.  In the above 
simulation, changing the medical success rate to 95% provides the results in Table 2.  
Comparing the results of the simulation targeting improved medical success rates 
to the simulation of the current state reveals that the improved rate results reducing 
medical reclamas from 779.69 to 58.88, a reduction of 720.8 sourcing failures in a single 
AEF cycle.  This single improvement raises the overall sourcing success rate to 94%. 
Examining improvement efforts further by targeting 80% improvements on the 
top four drivers of reclamas, which are medical, line remarks, personnel actions, and 
Condition 5, and simulating the results based on the same single AEF input of 23,389 
results in a reduction of 1,618.42 sourcing failures and drives the sourcing success rate up 
to 97.95%.  Applying this improved sourcing success rate to the entire AF population of 
332,000 results in the ability to demonstrate successful accounting of 325,178.376, which 
means the employable war fighting capability, is increased by 22,973 warfighters over 
the current state.  This statement does not imply a member that cannot deploy is not an 
employable warfighter, it implies that members thought to be capable for deployment that 
turns out to be non deployable and in fact not only non employable for as a planning 
factor, they are 22,973 sourcing problems that will require last minute rework and 
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problem solving, as well as at a minimum an additional 22,973 re-sourcing requirements.  
All re-sourcing requirements are waste.  To envision the value of that waste, 22,973 are 
more than the initial requirements of a single AEF rotation.  It is the equivalent of 
wasting all of the work from all levels and agencies required to execute a single AEF 
sourcing effort.  Recognize this simulation would not represent true statistics for 
attempting to task the entire Air Force simultaneously; it merely simulates extending the 
evaluation over a longer period of time until 332,000 simulation attempts are made.   
Perhaps the most pertinent revelation of this simulation with regards to process 
improvement was the fact that the number of attempts required to successfully fulfill 
requirements had to be derived from other data, and was not reported as a metric itself.  
Measuring that information would result in a metric indicating the process success rate.  
This is significant from a process perspective because to have a successful process, there 
should be a metric to track process success, and there currently is not one. 
Summary 
This chapter utilized the information gained during the process discovery and data 
obtained from cooperating Air Force agencies and evaluated them with Process 
Improvement, Supply Chain Management, Logistics Management, and Statistical 
Probability methodology to produce supply chain maps and a statistical probability 
decision tree to aid in the assessment of the current state as well as possible future 
improvements.  It presented two supply chain maps simplifying the processes of planning 
and actual requirement fulfillment in order to provide visual indications of possible 
unnecessary or misplaced supply chain members or processes.  It also analyzed available 
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data to produce a statistical probability model to help map the various outcomes of 
sourcing attempts as well as initial estimations of the various probabilities for those 
outcomes.  This model also serves to illustrate what metrics would support process 
improvement and provided estimations of metrics that have not been tracked, but may be 
very useful.  Finally, in one of the final simulations, this model provided a first glimpse 
of the magnitude of waste that may be eliminated with properly focused improvement 
efforts. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter will discuss the conclusions of the research conducted by this study 
as well as its significance.  It will also identify the limitations of this research in an 
attempt to clarify its reliability.  Finally, this chapter will provide recommendations for 
action and future research. 
Conclusions of Research 
 The purpose of this study was to evaluate the process of supplying warfighters to 
CCDR’s.  Through a process of exhaustive literature review and interviews, it thoroughly 
examined the written processes and investigated gaps in the literature to develop a 
conceptual map of the major processes involved.  This conceptual map is not intended to 
be a step by step all inclusive instruction manual of sub processes, rather an overarching 
study attempting to link all of the sub processes together into a single piece of literature 
to enable evaluation of the larger process.  It successfully accomplished this task by 
bringing regulatory guidance together from numerous different specialty fields such as 
personnel, medical, and contingency planning as well as guidance from numerous 
echelons such as the DoD, CJCS, and Air Force.  It then brought all of that guidance 
together and reinforced the information with interviews of sub process experts.  Using 
this research, simplified sourcing process flow charts and conceptual supply chain maps 
were developed.  Finally, the available data was used to create a statistical probability 
decision tree to map possible outcomes of sourcing events in an effort to identify initial 
estimates of critical metrics pertaining to the sourcing process as well as to provide a 
model that would allow future researchers and leaders to manipulate the probabilities of 
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various outcomes in order to visualize the effects those changes will have.  The model 
also allows the user to simulate any value for the number of sourcing attempts to provide 
expected values of the various outcomes.  
In addition to providing tools for future research and improvement efforts, the 
research suggests that the process needs improvement.  It also identifies some areas of 
concern that should be addressed with either improvement efforts or further research.   
The first area of concern is ART reporting.  ART attempts to classify and 
communicate the readiness of capabilities electronically through numerous levels of 
supervision before it is viewed by it’s end user, the person attempting to match 
requirements to capabilities at AFPC.  The problem is that ART only uses three-color 
codes and limited stratification with ALC/ACC/DAV’s and commander comments that 
are all subjective.  The guidance for coding dictates only UTC’s capable of deployment 
within 72 hours should be coded as green, yet in an interview, a leader at AFPC’s 
scheduling office stated UTC’s with an ALC-C2 should be green.  This illustrates the 
problem of lack of standardized reporting in.  The problem here is that not only should 
individuals with any type ALC-C be considered unable to meet the 72-hour requirement 
because the medical waiver process would likely be overwhelmed should more than a 
few waivers be submitted at a time, but also because an ALC-C2 limits where the UTC 
can deploy.  However an ALC-C1 is supposedly cleared capable of world wide 
deployment provided it receives a waiver first.  Provided they get approved waivers, 
ALC-C1’s meet the worldwide deployment requirement to be green, however the 
judgment call on 72-hour readiness results in some ALC-C1’s being coded green and 
other Commanders coding them yellow.  If an ALC-C1 is green, it misrepresents it 
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readiness and the fact that depending on it’s ailment, (which cannot be in ART and is 
unknown to the scheduler) it must still navigate a waiver process that this research 
estimates to only have less than a 40% success rate.  Classifying ALC-C1’s as yellow 
presents the same problems between ALC-C1’s and ALC-C2’s.  C1’s are worldwide 
capable and C2’s are only CONUS capable (plus select few overseas locations), but they 
both carry the same color status in ART.  Further stratification enables the scheduler to 
discern the ALC-C1’s from the ALC-C2’s, but still insight into the probability of 
successfully obtaining a waiver for deployment can only be deciphered from the 
Commanders comments which cannot actually indicate an ailment. 
This problem with ART indicating the true capability of UTC’s that are other than 
green combined with the fact that the medical community is actually acting as capability 
suppliers during the actual requirement fulfillment process instead of during the planning 
process indicates a possible improvement opportunity.  The data suggests medical 
disqualification is the leading cause of sourcing failure.  The literature suggests AEF 
Tempo Band A and B are the natural equilibrium for all capabilities.  Functional 
managers are tasked with evaluating deployment tempo on a regular basis to determine 
the need to remain in surge operations.  This indicates that the majority of eligible 
members assigned to a UTC in any tempo band besides A or B should expect to be tasked 
every time they are vulnerable.  Given this information, having medically limited 
members in temp bands other than A or B obtain waivers prior to the sourcing window of 
their AEF vulnerability instead of after they are tasked would not be expected to 
significantly increase the burden on the medical waiver process.  Considering the 
statement from CENTCOM/SG that most waivers are evaluated strictly from an AOR 
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perspective and not based on the exact base the member will deploy to, those 
prequalification waivers can be preliminary prequalifications for the deployment 
locations that their ALC qualifies them for.  Additional restrictions to those locations can 
be identified by the MTF on the waiver.  For example an ALC-C1’s approved waiver 
could state “prequalified for all C-1 locations” or “prequalified for all C-1 locations with 
permanent treatment facilities”, etc.  These limitations do not divulge HIPPA information 
and can be included in the Commanders comments in ART to provide schedulers with 
better information.  The data indicates MTF’s are approximately 85% accurate at 
predicting the outcome of waivers submitted to COCOM/SG’s.  If the MTF’s process 
prequalification waivers for individuals prior to their sourcing window and then submit 
the waivers to the COCOM’s once individuals are tasked, it could potentially drastically 
increase the sourcing success of medically coded individuals. 
To capitalize on the improved stratification of medical limitations, and resolve 
frustrations with poor ART status coding, it should be recognized that 3 colors do not 
accurately represent the status of forces that have so many levels of readiness.  SORTS is 
a time-tested method of capability reporting for units that uses 6 levels of status 
reporting.  The ART stoplight should be evaluated to possibly add an additional color to 
provide the capability to communicate limitations more accurately.  For discussion, if the 
color blue were added as a status between yellow and green, it could be a good status 
indication for medical limitations that currently have a medical prequalification on file, 
while yellow would be reserved for those that do not.  It is important to note that these 
prequalifications are not actual COCOM approved waivers, just MTF approvals 
contingent upon final approval once the tasking is assigned.  Also it is important to 
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recognize that they are no more a duplication of the qualifications suggested by the 
normal ALC/AAC/DAV’s or profiles processes than an actual final waiver would be.  
The prequalificaions would be the medical recommendation of an expert examination of 
the member’s symptoms with consideration to available treatment at the possible 
deployed locations.   Using the statistical probability decision tree to simulate MTF 
prequalification and eliminate MTF waiver rejections from the post-sourcing equation 
results in an estimated decrease of 613 medical reclamas from 780 to 167, as well as 
increasing the overall sourcing success rate to 94%.  That is a 3% increase in total force 
capability accountability as well as a reduction in the sourcing workload of a single AEF 
by 613.  That is avoiding the waste associated at least 613 resourcing attempts which are 
handled by multiple people at multiple echelons, as well as the waste associated with 613 
reclama’s, and the additional costs incurred by duplicating any deployment preparations 
those 613 reclamas incurred before they were denied their medical waivers.  
Another area of interest identified by this study is the MAJCOM involvement.  
With modern data systems and improved communications, the value of continuing to 
have the MAJCOMs inserted in the process between the units and AFPC is questionable 
for a few reasons.  First, the By Name Sourcing method illustrates a process capable of 
little to no MAJCOM involvement.  Second, when the sourcing decisions are being made 
by a single overarching entity such as AFPC, having the individual MAJCOMs 
supplementing guidance and creating up to ten different variations of capability reporting 
and sourcing may prove counter productive.  Third, while the planning and functional 
management jobs accomplished at the MAJCOMs are very important, perhaps 
consolidating the manpower from all of the MAJCOM’s into a single entity would 
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improve standardization, and possibly enable a reduction in the total manpower required.  
Finally, having the FAM’s and planners consolidated at AFPC would allow substitutions 
to still be with consideration of the FOL teaming strategy, because often the next closest 
substitute geographically belongs to a different MAJCOM and would not otherwise be a 
viable substitution for a MAJCOM level FAM.   
Another revelation provided by this study is the lack of metrics.  There are a lot of 
metrics tracked, however there still seem to be critical gaps between what is tracked and 
the metrics that are key indicators of a successful deployment sourcing process.  
Developing the statistical probability decision tree identified numerous metrics that are 
currently not tracked, however are critical in understanding how the process is 
performing.  This includes the primary metric of tracking the sourcing success rate.  
Other missing data that would provide valuable insight are the number of waivers the 
MTF’s actually handle and their actual approval rates as well as stratifying medical 
reclamas based on if they result from known ALC’s (conditions already evaluated by an 
MEB), ACC’s (conditions over 30 but less than 365 days), or from conditions that occur 
post sourcing.  Other data that may improve the ability to evaluate the process are 
tracking the timelines of all reclamas to know when in the process they occur and 
tracking the tasking rates of the various ART reporting statuses.  For example, knowing 
how many personnel actions reclamas occur prior to tasking would indicate how well 
Commanders are complying with status updates in a timely manner and knowing whether 
UTC’s coded as green are being tasked more, the same, or less than UTC’s coded yellow.   
The final conclusion of this research is the discovery that, except for the P-codes 
and in the case of By Name Sourcing the number of contingency taskings and short tour 
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return date, candidate names/UIC/UTC’s are sourced without considering the minimum 
capability necessary to meet the requirement.  The study revealed that once the already 
mentioned criteria are sorted, the schedulers choose the first candidate on the list that 
meets the requirements.  This is good for meeting the single known demand presented to 
the scheduler at that time, but it is a sub-optimal allocation of resources to meet the 
maximum demand.  It ensures a candidate is sourced that appears to have the capabilities 
to meet the minimum requirements, however it does not ensure excessive capabilities are 
not sourced.  Back to the analogy of the pick up trucks.  If a car dealer that has 2-wheel 
drive and 4-wheel drive trucks does not track what type of truck it gives customers unless 
the customer specifically requests the increased capability of the 4-wheel drive, then it is 
apparent that occasionally customers that would be satisfied with a 2-wheel drive would 
actually be given a 4-wheel drive, and all customers wanting 4-wheel drives would be 
given 4-wheel drives…until the dealer runs out of 4-wheel drives.  At that point, every 
time that a customer wanting a 4-wheel drive is turned away because there are only 2-
wheel drives left, it is directly due to how the dealer managed it’s inventory.  This 
analogy resembles what appears to be the sourcing process currently used.  Every time a 
requirement is sourced with an excessive capability it is a lost opportunity.  If a 
requirement is being sourced that can be filled by a capability with an ALC-C2 limitation 
is actually filled with a fully capable green coded asset, then we are sacrificing the ability 
to fill future requirements with that fully capable asset.  For example, there are two 
UTC’s left in the pool of capabilities for the scheduled vulnerability cycle.  One is coded 
yellow with an ALC-C1 and the other is green.  A requirement is received to source one 
of these UTC’s to deploy to Al Udeid.  The green UTC happens to be at the top of the list 
80 
and is sourced for the requirement.  Now there is only the ALC-C1 coded UTC is left.  If 
a second requirement is received that is to somewhere the ALC-C1 cannot go, but the 
green UTC could have, then our mismanagement of assets caused this inability to meet 
the requirement.  The same scenario could apply for other UTC attributes that are visible 
to the schedulers such as Rank for individuals being sourced by name.  Sending a TSgt to 
fill a 7-level requirement when a SSgt will suffice only limits our pool of remaining 
resources and our ability to respond to line remarks stipulating TSgt’s only.  This means 
that instead of selecting the first qualified candidate, a process should be developed to 
select the first qualified candidate that minimizes wasted excess capability.  For example, 
all deployment requirements to stateside locations that are not sourced by other selective 
means, should be sourced with ALC-C2 limited candidates first.  
A third Supply Chain Map was developed illustrating one possible future state 
that may improve process efficiency, it is included in Appendix C and streamlines the 
processes by consolidating functional managers and other necessary planners at AFPC 
and eliminating the MAJCOMs from the process entirely. The map also implements the 
process of prequalifying medical waivers and eliminates MTFs from acting as suppliers 
during the requirements fulfillment phase. 
 
Significance of Research  
This study is an initial examination of a subject with little to no previously 
published research.  It provides a conceptual map of the process in a single written work 
which was previously unavailable.  It simplifies extremely complicated processes in a 
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manner that supports an understanding of the overarching process and provides a tool for 
further process improvement.   This research also developed estimations of metrics that 
were previously completely unknown and it developed a tool for modeling the effects 
various targeted changes have on the overall sourcing success rate.  It also identifies 
several improvement opportunities.  Finally, this research illustrates a process in need of 
significant improvement that has the ability dramatically increase the actual capabilities 
of the Air Force with the resources already on hand. 
Limitations of Research 
 Data is the most significant limitation of this research.  There was no data 
available to provide statistical analysis or to enable more accurate estimations.  One of 
the most impacting limitations is the lack of data pertaining to the specific details 
surrounding medical reclama’s.  No data was available to allow segregation based on 
ALC’s, pre/post tasking injuries, or even true MTF waiver statistics.  
 Generalizability is another limitation.  This is a study of a very unique process 
and does not easily generalize to any other application with the exception of the basic 
tools and methods used for the process evaluation.  Also, the data pertaining to the break 
out of reclamas by cause was specific to AFMC and not an ideal sample of all 
MAJCOMS. 
 Reliability of the probabilities developed with the statistical probability decision 
tree is limited by lack of data as well.  The lack of data required a lot of unsupported 
assumptions in an effort to field initial estimations.  All data related conclusions are 
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based completely on descriptive statistics without the benefit of inferential statistical 
support.   
Recommendations for Action and Future Research 
This study identified a need for action and future research.  Recommendations for 
action based on the results of this study are a review of sourcing policies with regards to 
optimizing resource management and possibilities of implementing a method of sourcing 
that fills requirements with the minimum capabilities necessary.  Next a review of the 
ART 3-color coding methodology is recommended as this study indicates the current 
method fails to accurately communicate capability limitations.  Additional research or 
action is needed to evaluate the costs of prequalifying medically limited members versus 
the potential benefits such as improved sourcing accuracy (capability accountability), and 
the reduced workload associated with decreased resourcing efforts.  Future research is 
recommended to gather data to improve the reliability and further elaborate upon the 
tools provided by this study.  Focused research on mapping the supply chain to identify 
value added and non-value added processes should provide significant results.  Further 
evaluation of the various causes of reclamas, surrounding circumstances and potential 
remedies should also prove to be extremely beneficial.  Finally, senior leadership should 
reevaluate the system of metrics used to track the health of the sourcing process and its 
implication as an indication of force capability accountability to identify and direct the 
use of carefully selected, yet specific metrics that will support an effective, efficient 
process that maximizes capability accountability.   
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During a time of doing more with less and dwindling resources, this study 
identifies an area as well as several opportunities for massive improvements in both 
process workload and resource utilization.  If the sourcing process success rate is brought 
up to a standard concurrent with DoD inventory accuracy rates, the Air Force stands to 
reclaim accountability of over 22,000 warfighters and to reduce the sourcing workload by 
almost an entire AEF rotation every 4-5 years at the current rate.    
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Appendix A:  DAV Codes (AFI_10-403, 2008) 
 
DAV DEFINITION DAV DEFINITION 
28 Unable to hand-carry or possess 56 Airman with less than 12 weeks Total Active fi rearms/ammunition Federal Military Service (TAFMS) 
29 Conditional release (ARC) 57 TOS less than 15 days/45 days/6 months 
30 Probation or rehabilitation program 58 Airman declines to extend 
3 1 Control roster 59 Duty and travel restriction 
32 Pending SFS/AFOSI investigation 60 Deferred from hostile fire zone 
33 Administrative or international hold 6 1 Sole surviving son or daughter 
34 Material witness 62 Functional category "L" pipeline 
35 Action under Article 15 - UCMJ 63 Needs Special Security Investigation Required (SSTR) clearance 
36 Prisoner 64 Requires mobility training 
37 Pending court martial/civil trial 65 Commander 's option 
38 Commander-directed hold 66 Conscientious objector 
39 Adoptive parent 67 Insufficient security clearance 
40 Assignment limited to base with hospital 68 Voluntary expiration term of service (ANG) 
41 Medical deferment 69 Involuntary expiration term of service (ANG) 
42 Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) action 70 Conditional release (ANG) 
43 Flying status under review 7 1 Promotion deferral (ANG) 
44 Exceptional Family Member Program 72 Mandatory separation date (ARC) (EFMP) deferment 
45 Humanitarian assignment or deferment 73 Age60 (ARC) 
46 Chronic humanitarian 74 Involuntary discharge pending (ARC) 
47 Substance Abuse Re-orientation and 75 Selective retention (ANG) Treatment (SART) program tracks 4/5 
48 Medically disqualified for deployment 76 Voluntary discharge request 
49 Pregnancy deferment 77 Other (ANG) 
50 Projected separation (within 180 days) 78 Projected for reenlistment (with in 180 days) 
51 Reserve officer DOS (with in 180 days) 79 Ex-Prisoner of War (POW) 
52 First-term airman DOS (with in 180 days) 80 Members under the age of 18-years old 
53 PCS inter-command (within 180 days) 96 ANG on special tour Military Personnel Appropriation (MPA) man-days 
54 PCS intra-command (within 180 days) 97 USAFR on spec ial tour MPA man-days 
55 Date Elig ible for Return from Overseas 98 ANG on extended active duty Presidential (DEROS) (within 180 days) call-up 
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Appendix B:  ART Checklist (AFI_10-244, 2010) 
 
  
AFI10-244  12 SEPTEMBER 2005    23  
Attachment 2 
ART MONITOR ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST 
Table A2.1.  ART Monitor Assessment Checklist. 
All units MUST use this checklist as a tool to assess UTC Personnel, Training, Equipment/ 
Supplies and Equipment Condition (PTEC) monthly in ART. ALWAYS consider what the 
UTC's MISCAP states when assessing. 
Current AEF  
GREEN = There are absolutely NO UTC deficiencies in any of the four assessed areas  G  
YELLOW = UTC can meet MISCAP but there are deficiencies to be noted   Y  
RED = UTC cannot meet MISCAP due to too many deficiencies   R 
BLACK = UTC is postured incorrectly and requires MAJCOM FAM attention. 
 
Check the appropriate shaded block (G, Y, R) below, depending on how you answer the question. The 
lowest rating in any area will drive the overall rating of the UTC. Any deficiencies must have remarks 
and Get Well Dates (GWD); check each month for expiration.  Only the FINAL rating is used in ART.  
Refer to the MISCAP, MANFOR, LOGFOR, MILPDS, AFI 10-244 (Ch 3), AFI 10-401 and AFI 10-403.  
Once an individual is associated to an AEF they cannot be changed without obtaining a MAJCOM/CV 
waiver IAW AFI 10-401, 9.7.6  
A: PERSONNEL  
1 MANNING: Are all position numbers in the UTC, as outlined by the MANFOR, filled by 
assigned personnel? 
 
a  Yes.  G  
b  No, but can still meet MISCAP.  GWD  Y  
c  No, and cannot meet MISCAP.  GWD  R 
2 CAFSC (Enlisted), DAFSC (Officer):  Do es  ea ch  me mb e r’s  CAFSC/DAFSC  li sted  in   ea ch  
UTC position number match the MANFOR requirement exactly?  
a  Yes.  G  
b  No, but substitution allowed by MISCAP or AFI 10-403. GWD  Y  
c  No, and substitution exceeds MISCAP and 10-403 allowances.  GWD  R 
3 GRADE: Does  each  member’s  grade  li sted  i
n
  e ach  UT C  po s i tion  nu mb er   ma t c h  th e  
MANFOR requirement? 
 
a  Yes.  G  
b  No, but substitution allowed by MISCAP or AFI 10-403. GWD  Y  
c  No, and substitution exceeds MISCAP and 10-403 allowances.  GWD  R 
4 DAV: Are all members free of any non-waiverable Deployment Availability Codes  
a  Yes.  G  
b  No, but can still meet MISCAP.  GWD  Y  
c  No, and cannot meet MISCAP.  GWD  R 
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Appendix C: Supply Chain Maps 
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Appendix C:  Supply Chain Maps 
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Appendix C: Supply Chain Maps 
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Appendix D:  Statistical Probability Decision Tree pg. 1/15 
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Appendix D:  Statistical Probability Decision Tree pg. 2/15 
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Appendix D:  Statistical Probability Decision Tree pg. 3/15 
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Appendix D:  Statistical Probability Decision Tree pg. 4/15 
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Appendix D:  Statistical Probability Decision Tree pg. 5/15 
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Appendix D:  Statistical Probability Decision Tree pg. 6/15 
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Appendix D:  Statistical Probability Decision Tree pg. 7/15 
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Appendix D:  Statistical Probability Decision Tree pg. 9/15 
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Appendix D:  Statistical Probability Decision Tree pg. 11/15 
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Appendix D:  Statistical Probability Decision Tree pg. 14/15 
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